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Abstract 
The information technology (IT) project risk management literature comprises two dominant but 
diverging bodies of knowledge: the normative and the experiential. We conducted a three-step 
dialectical review of this literature with the aim of creating a bridging body of knowledge. In the 
first step, delineation, we synthesize the overarching variance and process explanations in each body 
of knowledge and motivate the examination of their divergences. In the second step, contrastation, 
we perform a dialectical interrogation of these bodies to articulate their key assumption-level 
tensions. We elaborate on the most prominent tension between the two bodies, namely, the relative 
performance of intuition and deliberate analysis for project risk assessment. In the third step, 
sublation, we propose a theoretical model that resolves this tension. Anchored in both bodies of 
knowledge and drawing from managerial decision-making research, the model proposes that the 
relative performance of intuition depends on characteristics of the IT project manager (project-
specific expertise), the project (risks’ temporal complexity and risks’ structural complexity), and the 
project’s organizational environment (e.g., stakeholders’ involvement in risk management, methods-
using pressures). Moreover, the model posits that project-specific expertise moderates all the other 
effects. Building on the bridging knowledge insights from this model, we discuss how researchers 
can design interventions to increase project managers’ use of deliberate analysis when it is expected 
to outperform intuition or to encourage reliance on intuition when it is likely to outperform deliberate 
analysis. 
Keywords: IT Project Risk Management, Literature Review, Conceptual Assumptions, Grounded 
Theory Literature Review Method, Dialectical Review, Sublation 
Dorothy Leidner was the accepting senior editor. This research article was submitted on January 27, 2016 and went 
through three revisions.  
1 Introduction  
A longstanding objective of information technology 
(IT) project risk management research has been to 
advance knowledge useful for developing risk 
management prescriptions to guide IT project 
managers (ITPMs) (e.g., Alter & Ginzberg, 1978; 
Boehm, 1989; Keil, Cule, Lyytinen, & Schmidt, 1998; 
Taylor, Artman, & Woelfer, 2012). Such attempts are 
motivated by the enduring issue of the low success rate 
of IT projects (Charette & Romero, 2015) and 
supported by studies that found that appropriate risk 
response enactment is conducive to project success 
(Barki, Rivard, & Talbot, 2001). The ultimate 
objective of this review is to stimulate future research 
that will advance this kind of knowledge. 
Currently, there are two key bodies of knowledge in 
this area. The first is normative knowledge, anchored 
in decision theory-based risk management (e.g., 
expected utility theory, von Neumann & Morgenstern, 
Sublating Tensions in IT Project Risk Management   
 
244 
 
1947). Normative knowledge is developed chiefly by 
academics and is disseminated to practitioners through 
formal prescriptions (Kutsch & Hall, 2010; Taylor, 
2006), which have received some empirical support for 
their effectiveness (e.g., Barki et al., 2001; Jiang & 
Klein, 2000; Wallace & Keil, 2004). Over the years, 
many prescriptions have been incorporated into project 
management training materials (e.g., PMBoK by PMI, 
2013) and advanced in practitioner-oriented journals 
(e.g., Boehm, 1991; Nelson, 2007). 
The second knowledge base is experiential knowledge, 
which is created and held by ITPMs in their day-to-day 
experiences. This knowledge, ensuing from how risks 
are actually managed, is captured by academics who 
“search for sense in behavior” (March, 1978, p. 604). 
Studies on experiential knowledge are few but have 
gained growing attention in recent years (Kutsch & 
Hall, 2010; Kutsch, Denyer, Hall, & Lee-Kelley, 
2013). In doing so, researchers have drawn from 
theories such as prospect theory (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979) or the seminal works of scholars 
such as March (March, 1978; March & Shapira, 
1987) and Simon (1972, 1987).  
Despite some similarities, the normative and 
experiential bodies of knowledge have differing 
conceptualizations of core constructs and of their 
relationships. Accordingly, they sometimes result in 
significantly contrary risk assessments (e.g., no risk vs. 
severe risk) and risk response plans (e.g., action vs. 
inaction) (Bannerman, 2008; Drummond, 1996; 
Taylor et al., 2012), which can have severe 
implications for the success of IT projects. Moreover, 
attempts to make ITPMs fully apply normative 
prescriptions are sometimes unsuccessful, as many 
ITPMs, although trained with such prescriptions, 
disengage from applying them (Kutsch & Hall, 2009) 
or might practice them in a decoupled fashion just to 
gain legitimacy (Mignerat & Rivard, 2012).  
Given such diverging views of risk management, most 
researchers have chosen one as the foundation for 
advancing risk management knowledge and deriving 
prescriptions, the majority drawing on normative 
knowledge. However, taking a side can lead to 
performance issues. Whereas overreliance on 
normative prescriptions can lead to IT project failures 
(Drummond, 1996), relying exclusively on 
experiential knowledge can result in erroneous risk 
estimations (Kutsch & Maylor, 2011).  
Accordingly, some researchers have alluded to the 
possibility of a contingent performance for each 
knowledge type (e.g., Baskerville & Stage, 1996; 
Taylor, 2007; Taylor et al., 2012). For example, this 
can be achieved by capturing managerial intuitions at 
the beginning of a risk assessment effort and later using 
tool-based analytical risk assessments to complement 
intuitions (Baskerville & Stage, 1996). We suggest that 
this perspective would enable creating a new 
knowledge type—bridging knowledge—which has 
several merits. First, by adopting an initially neutral 
position on the gap between normative and 
experiential knowledge, it recognizes the need for 
future research to identify their relative performance 
(Taylor, 2005). Second, it provides a significant 
opportunity for theory building by considering the 
contingent relative performance of each approach 
(Taylor, 2007). Third, it can contribute back to practice 
by guiding researchers in developing new prescriptions 
of increased practical usefulness (e.g., Taylor et al., 
2012). Nonetheless, coherent development of bridging 
knowledge has been lacking to date.  
In this review, we aim to stimulate research on 
developing bridging knowledge by providing a deep 
understanding of the normative and experiential bodies 
of knowledge and reconciling their most salient 
tension. To this end, considering that generating such 
novel knowledge is a dialectical process (Nicolai & 
Seidl, 2010), we take a dialectical review approach 
comprising the three steps of delineation, 
contrastation, and sublation. This dialectical approach 
led us to propose a theoretical model of the relative 
performance of intuition and deliberate analysis for 
risk assessment. Anchored in two bodies of knowledge 
drawn from the managerial decision-making literature 
(Dane & Pratt, 2007; Salas, Rosen, & DiazGranados, 
2010), the model postulates that the relative 
performance of intuition depends on ITPMs’ 
characteristics (project-specific expertise), project 
characteristics (risks’ temporal complexity and risks’ 
structural complexity), and organizational 
characteristics (e.g., stakeholders’ involvement in 
risk management, methods-using pressures). The 
model also posits that project-specific expertise 
moderates all other proposed effects. 
We make three contributions to the IT project risk 
management literature. First, the delineation step adds 
to the scarce reviews in this area (e.g., Bannerman, 
2008) by synthesizing both bodies of knowledge by 
discussing their core constructs and developing their 
overarching models, thus providing a solid foundation 
for future research. Second, the contrastation step adds 
to the ongoing discussions of risk management 
assumptions (de Bakker, Boonstra, & Wortmann, 
2010; Kutsch & Hall, 2009; Taylor et al., 2012) by 
bringing systematicity and structure to the articulation 
of the assumptions specific to each knowledge type 
and thus identifying a dominant assumption. Third, the 
sublation step adds to the rare studies that allude to 
contingent performance for each knowledge type (e.g., 
Taylor, 2007) by offering a new theoretical model of 
the relative performance of intuition. Overall, as we 
embark on the need for more bridging research 
(research that addresses current knowledge tensions 
without assuming either side as universally better), we 
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expand—rather than simply extend—the calls for more 
normative (e.g., Sauer, Gemino, & Reich, 2008; 
Schmidt, Lyytinen, Keil, & Cule, 2001) or experiential 
(Kutsch et al., 2013; Lauer, 1996) research. 
We also contribute to methodology by offering a three-
step dialectical review approach of two contrasting 
bodies of knowledge. Particularly, in the contrastation 
step, we contribute to research that examines 
alternative conceptual assumptions (e.g., Alvesson & 
Sandberg, 2011; Davis, 1971) by introducing a coherent 
approach that adapts the grounded theory literature 
review method (Wolfswinkel, Furtmueller, & 
Wilderom, 2013) and treats papers as data, the 
manifestations of assumptions in papers as open codes, 
and the articulated assumptions as axial/selective codes. 
We begin this paper by explaining in more detail our 
three-step dialectical approach.  
2 Review Approach 
Figure 1 shows our dialectical review approach. We 
defined a review protocol and then took the three 
consecutive steps of delineation, contrastation, and 
sublation. Each step of this process is explained below. 
2.1 Review Protocol 
We used a review protocol to conduct a systematic 
literature review (Boell & Kecmanovic, 2015). We 
searched online databases (Business Source Complete 
on EBSCOHost and ABI/INFORM on ProQuest) for 
the term “risk” in the titles and abstracts of articles 
published between 1990-2016 in the AIS Senior 
Scholars’ basket of eight journals. For an initial 
screening, we examined the abstracts to verify 
relevance and kept only peer-reviewed papers. For 
each retained paper, we next searched forward and 
backward (Webster & Watson, 2002), expanding our 
initial set of journals. 
This resulted in identifying 268 papers (Table 1). We 
then read the abstracts, introductions, and conclusions 
of these papers and included those that focused on: (1) 
ITPMs, as they have risk management as part of their 
function (PMI, 2013); (2) in-house—not outsourced—
IT projects, to limit the variation on the nature of risk 
management and the role of ITPMs; and (3) project 
risks, but not the financial risks of investing in a project 
(e.g., Dewan, Shi, & Gurbaxani, 2007) or the 
business risks of the delivered system, to focus on 
the risks that are more likely to be under the control 
of ITPMs. This yielded 137 papers.  
Because the papers pertaining to the normative body of 
knowledge dominated this pool, we used practical 
screening (Okoli, 2015) and balanced the number of 
papers from each type of knowledge to enable creating 
dialectical forces of comparable size. We labeled each 
paper either “normative” or “experiential” on the basis 
of the knowledge type most pronounced in it. When 
both types were significantly discussed (e.g., Lyytinen, 
Mathiassen, & Ropponen, 1998), we labeled the paper 
“mixed” (see Appendix A for the coding scheme). 
Among the 137 papers, 88 (64%) related to normative 
knowledge, 18 (13%) were mixed and 31 (23%) 
related to experiential knowledge. We kept all 31 
papers with an experiential label, all 18 that were 
mixed, and the top 31 influential studies with a 
normative label (using their Google Scholar citation 
count as of October 2016), retaining 80 papers in total. 
Although we distinguished the two knowledge types at 
the paper-level to create a manageable pool, our level 
of analysis was an excerpt within a paper. 
2.2 Delineation 
The delineation step consisted of a theme-based 
literature review (Webster & Watson, 2002) 
addressing the question of what each body of 
knowledge yielded. This involved a concept-centric 
synthesis that identified and defined the core 
constructs in each body of knowledge and two effect-
centric syntheses that integrated key variance and 
process relationships. To manage the logistics of this 
analysis, we imported the papers as data sources in 
NVivo 11 and coded their constructs and relationships. 
In addition to delineating each body of knowledge, this 
step implied the existence of some dialectical tensions. 
2.3 Contrastation 
The contrastation step involved articulating dialectical 
tensions within the pool of papers. Because tensions 
refer to dichotomies or inconsistencies that appear to 
originate from contradictory extremes (Bartunek & 
Rynes, 2014), the two bodies of knowledge were 
analyzed to identify pairs of divergent assumptions 
about a key risk management theme. This focus on 
assumptions has two motivations. First, it has been 
suggested that awareness of normative assumptions is 
crucial to understanding why prescriptions from the 
normative body of knowledge are sometimes difficult to 
apply in actual IT projects (Taylor et al., 2012). Second, 
such assumptions are insufficient for building further 
reconciling theories that go beyond the normative view 
and span the experiential knowledge domain.  
To identify tensions, we conducted dialectical 
interrogation (Alvesson & Sandberg, 2011), which 
involved reading the papers in depth and iteratively 
comparing each unit of meaning about risk 
management in them with other relevant excerpts to 
allow the emergence of tensions. Our analysis was 
based on the premise that an assumption can have 
multiple manifestations—i.e., it is stated in different 
but essentially related ways. 
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Figure 1. A Three-Step Dialectical Review Approach 
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Table 1. The Composition of the Pool of Papers in Terms of Publication Outlets 
Source Papers identified in the initial search 
Papers retained after applying 
the inclusion/ exclusion criteria 
Papers 
kept 
Journals in the AIS basket of 8 64 28 28 
European Journal of Information Systems 9 5 5 
Information Systems Journal 6 3 3 
Information Systems Research 3 2 2 
Journal of Information Technology 17 10 10 
Journal of Management Information Systems 13 5 5 
Journal of Strategic Information Systems 2 0 0 
Journal of the Association for Information Systems 2 2 2 
MIS Quarterly 12 1 1 
Other journals with > 4 papers initially 
identified  121 71 35 
Communications of the ACM 14 7 5 
Communications of the AIS 5 4 2 
IEEE Software 28 19 7 
IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management 11 3 0 
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering 10 3 1 
Information & Management 6 4 3 
International Journal of Project Management 11 7 6 
Journal of Systems and Software 25 16 7 
Project Management Journal 11 8 4 
Other publication outlets 83 38 17 
Total 268 137 80 
Also, we considered that whereas in some papers the 
manifestations are empirically evidenced, in others 
they are taken for granted as true. Moreover, we 
considered that while sometimes such manifestations 
are explicitly visible in the excerpts, often they are 
implicit. For example, a manifestation that we 
discussed is: “Deliberate analysis increases the 
accuracy of risk estimates”. It is explicit in the 
statement that research on risk assessment tools holds 
“the assumption that the use of such devices will lead 
to more accurate risk perceptions” (Keil, Wallace, 
Turk, Dixon-Randall, & Nulden, 2000, p. 145); however, 
it is implicit in the argument that “with a risk factor 
checklist, project managers can avoid overlooking some 
risk factors” (Schmidt et al., 2001, p. 8). 
To ensure consistency, we used the coding techniques 
of grounded theory applied to literature reviews 
(Wolfswinkel et al., 2013). With the papers in NVivo 
11, we conducted open, axial, and selective coding 
(Strauss & Corbin, 1990). In open coding, we coded 
any potential manifestations in the papers. Here, we 
created and used some initial codes from the literature 
on risk management assumptions inside (e.g., de 
Bakker et al., 2010; Kutsch & Hall, 2009) and outside 
information systems (IS) (e.g., March & Shapira, 
1987; see Appendix D). During axial coding, we 
articulated many tensions around themes about which 
we had coded several opposing experiential and 
normative manifestations, and then transformed the 
commonality of each experiential and normative group 
of manifestations into a more abstract assumption. 
Finally, in selective coding, we purified the tensions 
and merged some of them in a manageable way. One 
author coded the entire pool; the other verified 10% of 
the codes for each manifestation. The few 
discrepancies were discussed until resolved, and the 
outcomes of this resolution were applied to the rest of 
the sample. We coded all 80 articles, although we 
reached saturation after analyzing 72 papers. After 
identifying three key tensions, we chose to focus on 
and explain the most salient one in order to promote 
rich development followed by focused sublation. 
2.4 Sublation 
The contrastation step revealed a salient dialectical 
tension between the two bodies of knowledge. Instead 
of treating these knowledge bases as forces that are 
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polarized one against the other (Bartunek & Rynes, 
2014), we aimed at creating a bridging knowledge that 
considers a contingent performance for each side. We 
thus developed a sublating assumption and a 
theoretical model that explains when each knowledge 
type outperforms the other by drawing from relevant 
management and IS literature. We also discussed how 
such a theoretical model, of course subject to empirical 
validation, translates to some avenues for future 
prescriptive risk management research.  
3 Delineation Findings: What Did 
We Learn from Each Body of 
Knowledge? 
We synthesized each body of knowledge along its 
core constructs and main research models. Our 
review revealed some commonalities.  
First, both bodies of knowledge include the core 
constructs of risk and risk response. In most studies, 
risks are concerned with undesired events and thus do 
not cover positive outcomes (e.g. Barki, Rivard, & 
Talbot, 1993; Boehm, 1991). A key undesired event is 
project failure caused by deviations from project 
objectives (e.g., Barki et al., 2001). In some studies, 
the undesired event is an intermediary event (e.g., user-
team conflict) that will later impact project objectives. 
Studies on both normative and experiential knowledge 
refer to the causes of undesired events (e.g., project 
characteristics such as complexity) as risk sources 
(Powell & Klein, 1996), risk items (Boehm, 1991; 
Keil, Li, Mathiassen, & Zheng, 2008), or risk factors 
(Barki et al., 1993). A risk response is a project 
management activity enacted to deal with specific risk 
sources or undesired events. Enacting a risk response 
is likely to change the state of a project (Charette, 
1996a) by either modifying the existing managerial 
activities (e.g., adopting an agile development 
approach rather than a traditional one) or performing 
extra activities (e.g., liaising with user representatives). 
In dealing with risks, risk responses can serve three 
purposes: avoidance, mitigation, or transfer (Charette, 
1996a; Heemstra & Kusters, 1996). Among these, risk 
mitigation is the most proactive way of responding to 
risks. It aims at reducing the likelihood of undesired 
events by reducing or eliminating risk sources and/or 
limiting their negative impact if they do occur. When 
no risk response is enacted, risks are being accepted.  
Second, both bodies of knowledge examine risks and 
risk responses at different levels of aggregation. For 
example, individual risk factors are combined to 
estimate the overall project risk (Wallace, Keil, & Rai, 
2004a) or risk exposure (Barki et al., 2001). Likewise, 
while some risk responses target specific areas of a 
project (e.g., increasing user participation), others 
pertain to the entire project, for example, terminating 
high-risk projects (Jani, 2011).  
Third, both bodies of knowledge have examined risk 
management using variance and process models. 
Variance models explain the relationships between risk 
management constructs such as risks, risk responses, 
and project performance. Process models look at the 
sequence of steps in risk management—for example, 
suggesting whether and how risk responses are enacted 
after some significant risks have been identified.  
Despite such commonalities, the two bodies of 
knowledge significantly differ in their definitions of 
constructs and their specification of research models. 
They thus provide different contributions to our 
understanding of IT project risk management. 
3.1 The Normative Body of Knowledge 
Most studies that constitute the normative body of 
knowledge have relied on classical decision theories 
such as expected utility theory (EUT) (von Neumann 
& Morgenstern, 1947) and have conceptualized risk 
management as decision-making (e.g., Lyytinen, 
Mathiassen, & Ropponen, 1996). The core constructs 
of this body of knowledge are presented below and the 
main learning yielded is synthesized within a process 
model and a variance model. 
3.1.1 Core Constructs 
Three risk-related constructs are key in this literature: 
risk, risk exposure, and residual risk (or residual risk 
exposure). Risk (used in its specific sense) refers to the 
probability of undesired outcomes (Barki et al., 2001). 
Risk exposure refers to expected loss (Barki et al., 
1993; Boehm, 1991; Heemstra & Kusters, 1996), 
which accounts for both the probability of undesired 
outcomes and their impact if they occur. Residual risk 
incorporates the risk-reducing effect of enacted risk 
responses (Jiang, Klein, & Chen, 2006; Nidumolu, 1995). 
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Figure 2. A Synthesis of the Conceptualizations and Operationalizations of Risk Exposure From the Normative Body 
of Knowledge 
Risk assessment is considered an analytical process. 
Such analysis can be carried out by deliberate thinking. 
For example, ITPMs can think about what can go 
wrong because of a specific risk factor. Nevertheless, 
researchers have dedicated much attention to measuring 
the risk exposure construct following EUT and its 
descendants. A second-order MIMIC construct displayed 
in Figure 2 summarizes these measurement efforts. 
Some studies have conceptualized risk exposure as a 
first-order reflective construct (e.g., Jani, 2011). 
Others have conceptualized it as a second-order 
construct with two dimensions: probability of failure 
(or of undesired events) and impact. While probability 
can be measured reflectively, it can also be measured 
formatively using a composite of the probabilities of 
specific undesired events. When probability is difficult 
to measure, it is approximated by the level of 
uncertainty in the project (Barki et al., 1993; Wallace 
et al., 2004a). One can measure uncertainty using 
direct indicators; yet to estimate uncertainty 
formatively, which is more common, a composite of 
multiple risk sources is used (e.g., Barki et al., 2001). 
Because formative measurement provides a rich and 
actionable understanding of a construct, the literature 
has developed several checklists of risk sources and 
events in IT projects (e.g., Barki et al., 1993; Keil et 
al., 2008; Lyytinen et al., 1998; Schmidt et al., 2001). 
While some lists are generic to most IT projects (e.g., 
Schmidt et al., 2001), others are tailored to specific 
project types such as ERP (e.g., Ehie & Madsen, 2005) 
or specific countries (e.g., Mursu, Lyytinen, Soriyan, 
& Korpela, 2003). To make such lists manageable, risk 
sources are ranked in order of importance (e.g., 
Boehm, 1991) or are combined into fewer categories 
(e.g., Wallace, Keil, & Rai, 2004b). Categorization is 
performed using theories such as a sociotechnical 
model of software development (e.g., Lyytinen et al., 
1998), methods such as cluster analysis (e.g., Wallace 
et al., 2004b), perceptions such as perceived level of 
controllability and/or importance of risks (e.g., Keil et 
al., 1998; Mursu et al., 2003), temporal characteristics 
such as a priori versus emergent nature of risks 
(Gemino, Reich, & Sauer, 2008), or project phases 
(e.g., Powell & Klein, 1996). Taken together, these 
lists suggest that, while technology-related risks are 
important, user risks (e.g., user resistance) and top 
management support are major issues (Keil et al., 
1998; Schmidt et al., 2001). 
The second dimension of risk exposure is the impact 
of risks. Reflectively, impact indicators can be derived 
from risk archives, brainstorming, or ITPMs’ 
perceptions. Formatively, one can identify various 
impacts of risks and assign a magnitude of impact 
values to the risk events. Risk impacts are usually 
conceptualized as the extent of deviation from various 
specified project objectives (Barki et al., 2001). 
Traditionally, project objectives are specified using 
the three dimensions of time, cost, and scope; but 
more recently, stakeholder satisfaction and 
acceptance have also been considered (de Bakker et 
al., 2010; Jiang & Klein, 1999).  
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The next step in assessing risk exposure is to combine 
the two dimensions. Following the expected utility 
formula in EUT, many have done so by multiplying the 
measured probability (or uncertainty) and impact 
values (Barki et al., 1993; Baskerville & Stage, 1996; 
Boehm, 1991; Charette, 1996a), thus creating a 
multiplicative multidimensional construct (Law, Wong, & 
Mobley, 1998). This can be done by a manual calculation 
or by using a software tool that embeds the formulae (e.g., 
Du, Keil, Mathiassen, Shen, & Tiwana, 2007).  
In a comprehensive measurement of risk exposure, 
Barki et al. (2001) measure this construct 
simultaneously as a first-order construct in a reflective 
fashion (using criterion variables) and as a 
multiplicative second-order construct (using formative 
items for each uncertainty and impact dimension).  
While much research attention is paid to defining and 
measuring risks, as also noted by de Bakker et al. 
(2010), not very much has been said about risk 
responses. In discussing risk responses, researchers 
have addressed the question of what should be the 
response to a specific risk source (Lyytinen et al., 
1998) and have offered lists of heuristics that associate 
risk sources with risk responses (e.g., Addison & 
Vallabh, 2002; Baccarini, Salm, & Love, 2004; 
Baskerville & Stage, 1996; Boehm, 1991; Keil et al., 
1998; Lyytinen et al., 1998; Moynihan, 2002; Sumner, 
2000; Tesch, Kloppenborg, & Frolick, 2007). Three 
broad categories of risk responses are internal 
integration (dealing with project teams), external 
integration (with end users), and formal planning (e.g., 
Barki et al., 2001; Gemino et al., 2008; Mignerat & 
Rivard, 2012). These categories have been used to 
measure a project’s risk management profile as a 
multidimensional construct (Barki et al., 2001). 
3.1.2 Process Studies 
A central theme in the normative body of knowledge 
is the formal risk management process, portrayed as 
comprising several phases required to ensure risk 
assessment and control (Charette, 1996a). The generic 
process, adapted from the choice process in classical 
decision theories, is presented in Figure 3. It captures 
essential elements of several prescribed processes 
(e.g., Charette, 1996a; Fairly, 1994; Heemstra & 
Kusters, 1996; Powell & Klein, 1996) especially from 
Boehm (1991). Table C1 in Appendix C presents the 
studies that mention each step, and other reviews of the 
processes are available in Kutsch and Hall (2009, p. 73, 
Table 1) and Bannerman (2008, p. 2121). Our analysis 
suggests that risk management often includes the two 
major steps of risk assessment and risk control. Risk 
assessment involves (S1) risk identification (e.g., using 
a risk checklist to identify risk sources in a project); 
(S2) risk analysis (i.e., estimating the risk exposure of 
each of the identified risk sources, for example, by 
analyzing probabilities and impacts); and (S3) risk 
prioritization (i.e., using risk exposure to rank risks in 
the order of deserved attention). Risk control 
comprises (S4) risk response planning (e.g., using 
heuristics lists to choose risk responses); (S5) risk 
response enactment (implementing risk responses to 
deal with risks); and (S6) risk monitoring, in which 
risks and the planned responses are kept in a risk 
register (log) and are reviewed over the course of the 
project to ensure proper implementation. The entire 
process is frequently iterated as a cycle (S7). 
3.1.3 Variance Studies 
Several studies within the normative body of 
knowledge have theorized on and tested relationships 
between risks, risk responses, applying formal risk 
management practices, and project performance. Their 
key findings are synthesized in Figure 4. 
 
 
Figure 3. A Process Model of IT Project Risk Management Derived From the Normative Body of Knowledge (Adapted 
From Boehm, 1991) 
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Figure 4. A Synthesized Variance Model of IT Project Risk Management  
From the Normative Body of Knowledge 
As indicated by R1(-) in the model, risks negatively 
impact project performance (e.g., Nidumolu,1996; 
Wallace et al., 2004a). This negative impact can be 
direct (Jiang & Klein, 2000) or mediated through 
intermediary risks (Jiang et al., 2006; Gemino et al., 
2008; Wallace et al., 2004a). For example, social and 
technical risks influence project success via project 
management risks (Wallace et al., 2004a). Research 
suggests that specific risk responses can increase 
project performance if they fit with risks—R2(+). Fit 
has been examined in two ways. First, it has been 
identified theoretically, as a heuristic match between 
some specific risks and risk responses—that is, a 
presumably effective managerial intervention 
(Lyytinen et al., 1996; Lyytinen et al., 1998).  
Second, fit has been identified empirically, using 
calibration samples to determine what risk responses 
are appropriate for which risk exposure levels and 
which project performance criteria (product or 
process) (Barki et al., 2001). Without considering such 
a contingent fit, studying the direct impact of risk 
responses on project performance (R3+) resulted in 
mixed findings (Nidumolu, 1996). When there is a fit, 
risk responses contribute to project performance by 
reducing residual risk (R4-) that will have a weaker 
negative effect on project performance (R5-) than 
untreated risks (R1-) (Jiang et al., 2006; Nidumolu, 
1995). Research also suggests that applying a formal 
risk management process decreases some project risks 
and impacts project performance (R6+) (Ropponen & 
Lyytinen, 1997), especially because it offers a 
communicative action that enables project 
stakeholders to talk about risks (de Bakker, Boonstra, 
& Wortmann, 2011). Also, R6(+) has an inverted-U 
shape, in that it has been shown that very low levels of 
risk management and very high levels of risk 
management deter project performance (Ropponen & 
Lyytinen, 1997). Table C2 in Appendix C details the 
findings of each relevant study in our pool. 
3.2 The Experiential Body of 
Knowledge 
The experiential body of knowledge is based on the 
premise that understanding the nature of IT project risk 
requires studying ITPMs’ risk judgments (Lauer, 
1996). Our review yielded a relative scarcity of studies 
adopting an experiential perspective, aiming to understand 
how ITPMs manage risks and why they sometimes do so 
differently from normative prescriptions. Below we present 
the core constructs from this literature and synthesize its 
key process and variance findings.  
3.2.1 Core Constructs 
A core construct in this literature is perceived risk (or 
risk perception). Drawing from Sitkin and Pablo 
(1992), researchers have defined perceived risk as “the 
belief that there exist sources of risk with potential to 
adversely affect project outcomes” (Du et al., 2007, p. 
272). Like the notion of risk exposure, risk perception 
has been conceptualized as reflecting both the 
probability of undesired events and the loss associated 
with their occurrence (Du et al., 2007). There are 
indications, however, of the difference between the 
risk perceptions of ITPMs and risk exposure as defined 
in the normative body of knowledge. First, ITPMs 
often focus on few but not many risk factors (Schmidt 
et al., 2001). Second, as compared to the normative 
definition of risk exposure, ITPMs’ risk perceptions 
focus on the impact rather than the probability of 
occurrence of risk events (Keil et al., 2000); Third, for 
ITPMs, there might be more dimensions to risk 
perception, including uncontrollability (Keil et al., 
1998; Mursu et al., 2003; Pablo, 1999), lack of 
information (Pablo, 1999), and the timing of a loss 
occurrence (Kutsch et al., 2013). Most attempts to 
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capture the level of perceived risk use self-reports 
with reflective indicators (e.g., Du et al., 2007); 
however, recent neuroscience studies of risk 
perception motivate more objective ways of 
measuring it (e.g., Volz & Gigerenzer, 2012).  
Lists of ITPMs’ perceived risks have been compared 
across individuals (Moynihan, 1997), across ITPMs 
from different countries (Schmidt et al., 2001), to the 
risk lists in the normative body of knowledge 
(Moynihan, 1996; 1997), with other stakeholders such 
as senior executives (Liu, Zhang, Keil, & Chen, 2010), 
and with users (Keil, Tiwana, & Bush, 2002). It 
appears that ITPMs differ significantly in terms of the 
risk factors they attend to (Moynihan, 1997). 
Moreover, although there is an overlap between the 
risk sources that ITPMs perceive to be recurring and 
the risk sources covered by influential normative 
studies, ITPMs also raise issues that have received 
little attention in the normative body of knowledge, 
such as the extent of control over a project or the source 
of project control (Moynihan, 1996).  
Also, the literature highlights the specific risk 
responses that ITPMs enact (Liu et al., 2010; 
Moynihan, 2000; Tesch et al., 2007), which are 
sometimes different from those of other sources (e.g., 
senior executives; Liu et al., 2010). At the project level, 
three commonly studied risk response decisions of ITPMs 
are: accepting to undertake a project (Lauer, 1996), 
continuing with a project (Keil et al., 2000), or applying 
formal risk management prescriptions in a project (Kutsch 
& Hall, 2009). Research suggests that deliberate risk 
ignorance, especially in the form of waiting to see what will 
happen and dealing with it if it happens, is a common risk 
response (Kutsch & Hall, 2005). 
3.2.2 Process Studies 
It has been noted that normative studies have largely 
assumed that ITPMs will—most likely—use 
normative prescriptions (de Bakker et al., 2010). 
However, experiential studies find that ITPMs often 
disengage from most normative prescriptions over 
time. In terms of the overall process, one study of 
ITPMs found that they considered risk management a 
“box-ticking” exercise, which suggests that they did 
not consider it a worthwhile practice (Kutsch & Hall, 
2005). Moreover, studies have found that the majority 
of the ITPMs surveyed did not follow any risk 
management approach (Ropponen, 1999). 
Disengagement from formal risk management can 
happen at any point in the process. Figure 5 summarizes 
where these disengagements occur, and Table C3 in 
Appendix C details the findings in the literature.  
The first specific disengagement can happen from a 
formal risk identification (D1). An early study found 
that risk checklists were used by only 33% of ITPMs 
(Ropponen, 1999). Kutsch et al. (2013) report that 
among the 19 ITPMs in their study who planned on 
managing risks, five did not adopt any practice to 
identify risks. Yet, another recent study reports that 
risk identification was conducted in all the projects that 
were part of the study (de Bakker, Boonstra, & 
Wortmann, 2012). This supports the argument that 
some risk management processes are now widely 
institutionalized (Mignerat & Rivard, 2012). 
Regarding risk analysis (D2), studies have found that 
many organizations do not explicitly evaluate risk 
(Armour, 2005), especially in a quantitative fashion 
(Bannerman, 2008). Kutsch et al. (2013) report that 
among the 14 ITPMs who performed risk 
identification, seven did not assess the probabilities 
and eight did not determine the impacts of risks.  
 
 
Figure 5. A Synthesized Process Model of Experiential IT Project Risk Management 
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Figure 6. A Synthesized Variance Model of BoK2 Studies of IT Project Risk Management 
Likewise, researchers have found that ITPMs felt 
ambivalence about how accurately risk prioritization 
was conducted (Bannerman, 2008) (D3). Moreover, 
often risk assessment is not followed by risk response 
planning (D4) (Kutsch et al., 2013; Taylor, 2005). 
Even when specific risk responses are formally 
planned, they might never be enacted (D5) (Taylor, 
2005). Furthermore, ITPMs rarely refer to the risks 
logged in earlier project stages when taking an action 
(D6) (Taylor, 2005). 
Finally, the cycle of risk management is seldom iterated 
throughout the course of a project (D7) (Bannerman, 
2008; Carr, 1997; de Bakker et al., 2010); often, the 
formal risk management process is applied once at the 
beginning of a project, if at all (Bannerman, 2008). 
When ITPMs disengage from normative prescriptions, 
they might deliberately ignore risks (S1) and avoid any 
action—for instance, by delaying or delegating their 
risk response decisions (Kutsch & Hall, 2005; Kutsch 
& Hall, 2010). Alternatively, they might continue to 
perform risk management (S2) in an experiential 
way— e.g., using intuition (Baskerville & Stage, 1996; 
Drummond, 1996; Ropponen, 1999). Intuition refers to 
“automatic and relatively effortless processing and 
learning of information” (Dane & Pratt, 2007, p. 
35) and implies learning from personal experience 
and developing perceptions without explicit 
awareness (Dane & Pratt, 2007). It is, therefore, 
anchored in personal experience and expertise 
without using tools or techniques.  
3.2.3 Variance Studies 
Variance studies in the experiential body of knowledge 
are concerned with the antecedents of risk perception 
and the risk response enactment decisions of ITPMs 
(Figure 6). The findings of relevant studies are 
included in Table C4 in Appendix C. Those studies 
suggest that the normative knowledge-based 
prescribed tools and techniques (e.g., risk checklists) 
have some impact (P1) on the risk perceptions of 
ITPMs; they influence novice ITPMs but not experts 
(Keil et al., 2008). Researchers have examined the 
impact of other antecedents on risk perceptions. For 
example, following Sitkin and Pablo (1992), the 
impacts of ITPMs’ risk propensity on risk perception 
(P2) have been studied, although the results suggest 
limited (Huff & Prybutok, 2008) or insignificant (Keil 
et al., 2000) relationships. Similarly, the impact of 
ITPMs’ risk perception on risk response enactment, 
P3(+) is sometimes significant (Keil et al., 2000), but 
at other times insignificant (e.g., Du et al., 2007). 
Moreover, normative tools and techniques have no or 
limited impact (P4) on the decision to enact risk 
responses (Du et al., 2007; Keil et al., 2008). 
Considering that P3 and P4 have limited effects, it 
seems that ITPMs’ risk response behaviors are 
largely determined by other factors (P5). One such 
examined factor is risk propensity, although it is 
found to have a limited (Huff & Prybutok, 2008) or 
insignificant (Keil et al., 2000) impact. Other factors 
discussed include the costs of risk responses and the 
politics around them (Bannerman, 2008). 
3.3 On the Creation of Dialectical 
Forces 
The above delineation effort recognizes several 
divergences between the two bodies of knowledge that 
thus create two dialectical forces. First, in terms of 
construct definitions, the normative and experiential 
bodies of knowledge differ on what constitutes risk and 
risk response. For example, while the normative risk 
exposure construct has a specific two-dimensional 
definition, risk perception captures a broader range of 
dimensions. Second, in terms of theoretical models of 
how risks should be assessed and responded to, the two 
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bodies of knowledge differ significantly. For example, 
experiential knowledge considers disengaging from 
the normative prescriptions on the risk management 
process as a rational decision (Kutsch & Hall, 2009). 
Apparently, there are some tensions about which 
behavior is more conducive to proper risk management 
and, thus, increased project performance. These 
tensions deserve to be better identified and addressed, 
considering that (1) IT projects have a high failure rate 
largely due to unmanaged risks (Bloch, Blumberg, & 
Laartz, 2012; Charette & Romero, 2015; Flyvbjerg & 
Budzier, 2011); (2) risk management prescriptions in 
research can be disseminated to ITPMs (Mignerat & 
Rivard, 2012); (3) the existence of these tensions, 
given the possible wisdom in both bodies of 
knowledge, makes choosing only one of them for 
developing prescriptions a frail decision (Baskerville 
& Stage, 1996); and (4) to date, clear guidelines on 
how to address the tensions by reconciling the two 
knowledge bases is lacking. Therefore, in the next 
section we will contrast the two bodies of knowledge 
to find a core dialectical tension; and, in the section 
after that, we will attempt to reconcile that tension. 
4 Contrastation Findings: What 
Are Some Key Conceptual 
Tensions Between the Two 
Bodies of Knowledge? 
The contrastation step revealed dialectical tensions 
between the assumptions of the two bodies of 
knowledge. In particular, we found a widely discussed 
tension regarding the relative importance of the 
probability and impact dimensions of risk exposure (48 
relevant excerpts in 28 papers). Whereas the normative 
view assumes that the probability of the undesired 
outcomes dimension of risk exposure is at least as 
important as the impact of the undesired outcomes 
dimension, the experiential view considers that the 
impact of the undesired outcomes dimension of risk 
exposure is more important than its probability of 
occurrence dimension (e.g., Bannerman, 2008; Taylor 
et al., 2012). We identified another key tension 
regarding the relative importance of various 
determinants to be considered for a risk response 
decision (161 pertinent excerpts in 42 papers). Our 
contrastation revealed that the normative body of 
knowledge—as a collective—assumes that the 
determinants of a successful risk response enactment 
decision are the level of risk exposure and the expected 
risk-mitigation effects of the risk response; however, 
the experiential body of knowledge considers that the 
determinants of a successful risk response enactment 
decision are beyond the level of risk exposure and the 
risk-mitigation effects of the risk response. One 
dialectical tension about the nature of risk assessment, 
however, stood out in our contrastation (199 relevant 
excerpts in 53 papers). Given that risk assessment is often 
a key basis for any risk response action, in the following 
we choose to focus on this salient tension to enable a 
deeper discussion of contrastation as well as sublation.  
4.1 A Key Tension About the Nature of 
Risk Assessment: The Relative 
Performance of Intuition and 
Deliberate Analysis 
Both normative and experiential bodies of knowledge 
agree that the performance of risk assessment—which 
refers to both effectiveness and efficiency—is 
important for project success. Effectiveness involves 
the ability of the risk assessment process to cover all 
significant risk sources and events (Powell & Klein, 
1996), risk interrelationships (Hwang, Hsiao, Chen, & 
Chern, 2016), and risk timing and dynamics (Hwang et 
al., 2016; Ward, 1999). It also concerns the ability of 
the process to provide sound risk exposure estimates to 
prioritize the identified risk sources in the order of the 
response attention they need (Ward, 1999). Effective 
risk assessment provides an impetus for timely action 
before it is too late by influencing the behavior of key 
stakeholders (Thamhain, 2013). For example, it can 
motivate ITPMs to coordinate an appropriate risk 
response enactment or to synchronize the perceptions 
of those involved (de Bakker et al., 2011). Efficiency 
is concerned with the cost justifiability of the resources 
(e.g., effort) required for producing an accurate risk 
assessment (Kutsch and Hall, 2009), considering that 
project managers often lack the power to secure all the 
required resources (Pinto, 2000). Our contrastation 
revealed a conceptual tension between the two bodies 
of knowledge on the relative performance of intuition 
and deliberate analysis for risk assessment. 
4.2 Normative Assumption 
Most of the normative body of knowledge has 
prescribed that ITPMs perform a deliberate analysis of 
risks using the offered tools (e.g., risk archives, risk 
checklists, risk exposure instruments) and techniques 
(e.g., calculating risk exposure by conducting 
brainstorming sessions). Indeed, research suggests that 
such analysis provides a scientific anchor to risk 
assessment (Slovic & Peters, 2006) and is a means of 
focusing attention on the risk assessment exercise 
(Dane & Pratt, 2007). In this regard, our contrastation 
reveals several manifestations of how and why the 
normative body of knowledge considers deliberate 
analysis to outperform intuition.  
Some manifestations concern the relative effectiveness 
of deliberate analysis. In Manifestation A, it is 
suggested that deliberate analysis covers a wider range 
of relevant risks than intuition. Analytical tools can 
enable organizational learning by capturing the past 
experiences of experts (Lyytinen & Robey, 1999). For 
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example, specific risk repositories enable learning 
within organizations, and generic risk checklists (often 
developed through Delphi studies of experts) enable 
learning across organizations (e.g., Moynihan, 1997; 
Schmidt et al., 2001). The normative body of 
knowledge considers that by using such learning, more 
relevant risks could be identified. For example, Keil et 
al. (2008) conclude that the risk checklist they 
developed in their study helps ITPMs identify actual 
risks. In Manifestation B, using deliberate analysis is 
viewed as increasing the accuracy of risk estimates 
(Keil et al., 2000). This manifestation considers that 
intuition can be erroneous and that analytical 
approaches help ITPMs avoid cognitive biases that can 
lead to missing or over/underestimating risks 
(Gemmer, 1997; Kutsch & Maylor, 2011). In 
Manifestation C, deliberate analysis is considered to be 
a better motivator for risk response enactment than 
intuition. Deliberate analysis using techniques such as 
risk brainstorming sessions is viewed as enabling 
communicative action that can harmonize the risk 
perceptions of different stakeholders (de Bakker et al., 
2011) and thus reduce disparities among stakeholders’ 
perceptions (Keil et al., 2002). Accordingly, they are 
believed to enable a group of experts to reach a consensus 
and orchestrate action (Lyytinen et al., 1998). Likewise, 
as Drummond (1996) reports, some view intuitions as 
inadmissible for risk response decision-making.  
The last manifestation concerns the higher efficiency 
of deliberate analysis. In Manifestation D, it is 
suggested that deliberate analysis reduces the required 
information processing efforts because it standardizes 
how risks are identified (e.g., using checklists) and 
how multiple items of information about risks are 
reduced into an overall evaluation (e.g., using the risk 
exposure formula). Such standardization helps ITPMs 
save effort in selecting and agreeing upon how to 
combine various items of information.  
In formal terms: 
Normative Assumption: Oftentimes, deliberate 
analysis outperforms intuition for risk assessment 
4.3 Experiential Assumption 
Our synthesis of experiential studies (capturing the 
experiential knowledge created by ITPMs) suggests 
that ITPMs often decide upon risk responses based on 
risk perceptions derived by intuition without the 
assistance of analytical risk assessment tools and 
techniques (Bannerman, 2008; Kutsch et al., 2013; 
Ropponen, 1999). Our contrastation reveals several 
manifestations of how and why many ITPMs (and 
some researchers alike) assume that intuition performs 
relatively better than deliberate analysis.  
Some manifestations concern the relative effectiveness 
of intuition. In Manifestation E, it is suggested that 
ITPMs’ intuition covers a wider range of relevant risks 
than risk checklists can. Risk checklists are argued to 
have a narrow span of attention (Lyytinen et al., 1998) 
and to create serious risk blind spots (Du et al., 2007; 
Keil et al., 2008). In Manifestation F, intuition is 
considered to provide more realistic risk estimates than 
deliberate analysis. While deliberate analysis tools and 
methods suggest a structured way of assessing risks, 
some ITPMs doubt whether risks can be carefully 
analyzed, believing that the produced risk estimates are 
not real (Kutsch et al., 2013). Particularly, deliberate 
analysis is viewed as conveying a false sense of 
precision, for example, by providing too precise 
probability estimates (Pfleeger, 2000). Moreover, 
intuition can see more dimensions to risk such as its 
timing or controllability (Pablo, 1999). In 
Manifestation G, intuition is considered to be more 
conducive to proper risk response enactment. Risk 
assessment tools and techniques sometimes have a 
limited impact on ITPMs’ risk perceptions 
(Baskerville & Stage, 1996; Du et al., 2007) and 
response behaviors (Kutsch et al., 2013). The outputs 
of most risk assessment tools present risk assessment 
results as dry statistics—that is, in a too factual manner 
which lacks the affect that might be necessary for 
individuals to take action (Slovic & Peters, 2006). 
However, intuition can motivate action because it 
creates an affective charge referred to as “gut feel” 
(Akinci & Sadler-Smith, 2012, p. 116), which is potent 
enough to induce action (Gigerenzer, 2008). Particularly, 
a strong negative intuition may be experienced with 
visceral reactions, such as fear, anxiety, or dread 
(Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001), effects that 
deliberate analysis is less likely to induce.  
The last manifestation concerns the efficiency of 
intuition. In Manifestation H, intuition is considered to 
be less effortful than deliberate analysis. Intuition is 
heuristic driven and thus relies on mental shortcuts, 
such as reliance on accessible information (e.g., what 
happened last time) (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) for 
judgment and decision-making. However, analysis can 
be unreasonably cumbersome. For example, for 
Taylor’s (2005) respondents, risk management in its 
normative sense was costly and considered a luxury. 
In formal terms:  
Experiential Assumption: Oftentimes, intuition 
outperforms deliberate analysis for risk 
assessment. 
Figure 7 illustrates the dialectical tension between the 
views on the relative performance of analytical and 
intuitive risk assessments. The next section proposes a 
model that can reconcile this tension. 
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Figure 7. A Summary of the Dialectical Tension Between the Normative and Experiential Bodies of Knowledge on the 
Relative Performance of Intuition and Deliberate Analysis for Risk Assessment 
5 Sublation: Reconciling the 
Dialectical Tension on the 
Relative Performance of 
Deliberate Analysis and 
Intuition 
To reconcile the dialectical tension between the 
normative and the experiential bodies of knowledge on 
the relative performance of deliberate analysis and 
intuition, we adopt the perspective that the approaches 
may be complementary, implying that analytical 
methods can be complemented with managerial 
judgments (Thamhain, 2013). Therefore, rather than 
taking sides on either view, we sublate the views 
toward creating bridging knowledge. We first 
articulate an assumption that enables developing 
contingent theories that can account for both views:  
Sublating Assumption: Intuition and deliberate 
analysis can outperform each other.  
We then build on this assumption to develop a 
theoretical model of the contingencies that influence 
the relative performance of each approach (Figure 8). 
Drawing from the managerial decision-making 
literature (e.g., Dane & Pratt, 2007; Salas et al., 2010), 
we suggest that the three antecedent categories of 
project characteristics (risks’ temporal complexity and 
risks’ structural complexity), organization 
characteristics (project stakeholders’ involvement and 
methods-using pressures), and ITPMs’ characteristics 
(project-specific expertise) explain the relative 
performance of intuition and deliberate analysis for risk 
assessment. We also emphasize the role of project-specific 
expertise by explaining its moderating effects. The model’s 
constructs and their definitions are listed in Table 2. 
5.1 Project Characteristics 
Risks’ Temporal Complexity. Project temporality 
refers to “the transition from the starting conditions to 
what happens during the project to its outcomes” 
(Gemino et al., 2008, p. 12), which creates risks with 
complex temporal characteristics (Gemino et al., 2008; 
Hwang et al., 2016; Ward, 1999). To examine two such 
characteristics, we define risks’ temporal complexity 
by the two dimensions of risk source emergence and 
risk event imminence. Risk source emergence refers to 
the extent to which the cause of an undesired outcome 
emerges during a project (Gemino et al., 2008). As risk 
values change over time, new risks can continue to 
emerge during a project. Risk event imminence refers to 
the extent to which the negative impact of a risk source 
on project performance is likely to materialize in a 
looming risk event after the risk source has emerged 
rather than in a distant risk event (Ward, 1999).  
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Figure 8. A Model of the Relative Performance of Intuition and Deliberate Analysis for IT Project Risk Assessment 
We propose that risks’ temporal complexity increases 
the relative effectiveness of intuition in two ways. 
First, risk source emergence influences the relative 
estimation accuracy of intuition. A priori risks are 
discovered early in projects (Gemino et al., 2008) 
when ITPMs have not yet developed a deep 
understanding of the project. Such unfamiliarity with 
the specifics of a project makes ITPMs’ intuition 
unready for pattern recognition; thus, they may rely on 
generic risk checklists to understand risks (Thamhain, 
2013). However, emergent risks arise when a project 
has progressed in time and ITPMs have developed a 
deeper familiarity with the project. This effect is 
consistent with the findings that analytical tools are 
used chiefly at the beginning of IT projects 
(Bannerman, 2008; Ropponen, 1999; Taylor, 2007). 
Second, risk source emergence increases the relative 
action impetus of intuition. Sometimes, risk responses 
might be effective only if they are enacted early 
enough (Addison & Vallabh, 2002). But emergent 
risks do not have a specific timeframe for arising; 
therefore, they require ongoing consideration unless 
some action can eliminate them (Ward, 1999). While 
intuition is continuous, deliberate analysis needs to be 
iterated (Baskerville & Stage, 1996)—for example, as 
a risk review after each project milestone. Thus, 
intuition is more instrumental in dealing with emergent 
risks. The importance of such continuous risk 
assessment has been emphasized in IS by highlighting 
the role of maintaining risk mindfulness (Kutsch et al. 
2013) and situational awareness (Taylor, 2007). 
Similarly, when risks are identified, they may need an 
urgent response. This urgency creates time pressure, 
and intuition outperforms analysis under time pressure 
(Dane, Rockmann, & Pratt, 2012). Intuition quickly 
induces feelings of dread and stress, and thus it is 
instrumental when there is a need to act fast 
(Gigerenzer, 2008); but, with some exceptions (e.g., 
Ward, 1999), most deliberate analysis methods are 
silent about risk response urgency. 
We also propose that risks’ temporal complexity 
influences the relative efficiency of intuition. Risk 
source emergence increases the frequency of 
reapplications of tools and techniques; therefore, it 
makes deliberate analysis increasingly more time-
consuming. Intuition, however, is quite automatic, no 
matter how many times it is used. Therefore, emergent 
risks make intuition relatively more efficient. 
Moreover, risk event imminence increases the time 
pressure; as time becomes a more precious commodity, 
deliberate analysis becomes costlier and less justified 
than intuition. Indeed, researchers suggests that time 
pressure motivates individuals to rely more on 
intuition than on deliberate analysis (Salas et al. 2010).
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Table 2. Construct Definitions  
Construct Definition Dimensions Definition Relevant studies 
Relative 
performance of 
intuition 
compared to 
deliberate 
analysis  
The difference between 
the performance of 
intuition and deliberate 
analysis for risk 
assessment in IT projects. 
Relative risk 
coverage 
The extent to which one risk assessment 
process (intuition or deliberate analysis) 
identifies more relevant risks than the 
other process.  
Du et al. (2007); Keil et al. 
(2008); Powell & Klein 
(1996) 
Relative 
estimation 
accuracy 
The extent to which one risk assessment 
process (intuition or deliberate analysis) 
identifies more reasonable risk exposure 
estimates than the other process. 
Kutsch & Hall (2005); 
Kutsch & Maylor (2011); 
Pfleeger (2000); Ward 
(1999) 
Relative action 
impetus 
The extent to which one risk assessment 
process (intuition or deliberate analysis) 
motivates taking a timely action 
concerning risks better than the other 
process. 
de Bakker et al. (2011); 
Kutsch & Hall (2010) 
Relative cost 
justifiability 
The extent to which one risk assessment 
process (intuition or deliberate analysis) 
is more efficient (time, effort, and other 
resources) than the other process. 
Kutsch & Hall (2009); 
Ward (1999) 
Risks’ 
temporal 
complexity 
The extent to which risks’ 
existence and nature 
fluctuate over time. 
Risk source 
emergence 
The extent to which the cause of an 
undesired outcome arises later in 
projects, versus existing earlier.  
Gemino et al. (2008); 
Thamhain (2013); 
Risk event 
imminence 
The time proximity between a risk 
source and the associated risk event(s). 
Hwang et al. (2016); Ward 
(1999) 
Risks’ 
structural 
complexity 
The extent to which risks 
are abundant and 
entangled in a project. 
Risk 
abundance 
The extent to which multiple risks 
coexist in a project. 
Barki et al. (2001); 
Schmidt et al. (2001) 
Risk 
entanglement 
The extent to which risks are 
interconnected by causing or amplifying 
each other. 
El-Masri & Rivard (2012); 
Hwang et al. (2016); 
Thamhain (2013); Ward 
(1999) 
Stakeholders’ 
involvement in 
risk 
management 
The extent to which 
various project 
stakeholders participate in 
risk assessment and risk 
response planning.  
Informational 
involvement 
The extent to which ITPMs need to 
inform other project stakeholders of 
particular risks. 
de Bakker et al. (2011); 
Thamhain (2013) 
Behavioral 
engagement 
The extent to which ITPMs need to 
collaborate with other stakeholders in 
deciding about and committing to risk 
responses. 
de Bakker et al. (2011); 
Kutsch & Hall (2010); 
Thamhain (2013) 
Methods-using 
pressures 
The extent to which 
credible sources of 
pressure expect the 
application (or 
nonapplication) of 
deliberate risk assessment 
practices. 
Direct 
pressures 
(injunctive) 
The extent to which using a specific 
analytical tool or technique is mandated. 
Mignerat & Rivard (2012) 
Indirect 
pressures 
(descriptive) 
The extent to which risk management is 
routinized in the environment 
surrounding an ITPM. 
Kutsch et al. (2013) 
Project-specific 
expertise 
The extent to which an 
ITPM has developed a 
deep and rich knowledge 
base from extensive 
experience with managing 
similar IT projects. 
Experience The extent to which an ITPM has gained 
practical contact with similar IT 
projects, including the number of years 
of managing such projects and the 
number of projects. 
Huff & Prybutok (2008) 
Training The extent to which an ITPM has 
received training—formal or informal—
related to managing similar projects.  
Huff & Prybutok (2008) 
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Proposition 1:  Risks’ temporal complexity positively 
influences the relative performance of intuition 
compared to deliberate analysis for risk assessment.  
Risks’ Structural Complexity. Another aspect of 
complexity in projects is the number of structural 
elements and their interactions (Thamhain, 2013; 
Whitty & Maylor, 2009). Building on this, we define 
project risks’ complexity as the extent to which risks 
are abundant and entangled in a project. Risk 
abundance refers to the extent to which multiple risks 
coexist in a project. Indeed, IT projects can involve 
various risks such as new technologies, large 
application size, lack of team expertise, application 
complexity, and uncertainty about requirements (Barki 
et al., 2001). Risk entanglement refers to the extent to 
which risks are intertwined by causing or amplifying 
each other (El-Masri and Rivard, 2012; Hwang et al., 
2016; Thamhain, 2013; Ward, 1999). Together, risk 
abundance and risk entanglement can create 
compounding outcomes, with risks exhibiting 
cascading and/or nonlinear effects. For example, few 
small unattended risks can create a domino effect 
(Hwang et al., 2016; Thamhain, 2013). Risks’ structural 
complexity varies across projects. For example, while it 
might be low in a small IT infrastructure project, it could 
be strong in large projects (Charette, 2005).  
We propose that project risks’ structural complexity 
increases the relative estimation accuracy of intuition. 
First, low risk abundance and entanglement mean that 
the structure of the problem can be easily decomposed 
(e.g., using a root cause analysis, or by defining one 
impact and one probability value instead of a 
distribution for each) so that each piece can be 
analytically evaluated. A typical deliberate analysis 
can be performed under such situations. However, high 
complexity means an increased number of 
informational items are processed in an unstructured 
way. Deliberate analysis involves controlled reasoning 
and comprehensive logic (Kahneman & Frederick, 
2005) in which the problem is decomposed into 
multiple evaluable pieces (so that one can name the 
analytical steps taken to produce the results) and, as 
such, cannot easily handle complex and dynamic 
situations. While analytical methods that can 
reasonably deal with high complexity are rare (Hwang 
et al., 2016), intuition can simultaneously handle 
multiple informative items (Dane & Pratt, 2007) in an 
indecomposable context (Dane et al., 2012; Salas et al., 
2010) since it uses heuristics processing (Kahneman & 
Frederick, 2005). Second, low risk entanglement 
means less dynamic effects, and the analytical results 
will remain valid for some time. However, risks’ 
structural complexity can create high temporal 
complexity, and, as proposed above, intuition 
outperforms deliberate analysis for highly temporal 
risks. In the same vein, researchers suggest that while 
most analytical approaches are created using the 
normative body of knowledge (Lyytinen et al., 1996), 
simple heuristics might perform better under high 
uncertainty (Volz & Gigerenzer, 2012). Likewise, IS 
researchers argue that relying on experience is more 
advantageous in the context of complex and ill-
structured tasks (Huff & Prybutok, 2008).  
We also posit that project risks’ complexity increases 
the relative efficiency of intuition. When project risks 
are complex, analyzing all the informational items that 
interact and change dynamically can become an 
increasingly cumbersome task because it requires 
processing too many information cues (Dane et al., 
2012) which could lead to a state colloquially known 
as “paralysis by analysis”. Intuition, however, can 
continue to process multiple informational items in 
complex problem spaces rapidly and effortlessly 
(Kahneman & Frederick, 2005).  
Proposition 2: Risks’ structural complexity has a 
positive effect on the relative performance of 
intuition compared to deliberate analysis for risk 
assessment.  
5.2 Organizational Characteristics 
Stakeholders’ Involvement in Risk Management. 
We define stakeholders’ involvement in risk 
management as the extent to which various project 
stakeholders participate in risk assessment and risk 
response planning. Such involvement has two 
dimensions of informational and/or behavioral 
engagement. Informational involvement refers to the 
extent to which ITPMs need to inform other project 
stakeholders of particular risks. While 
communications with stakeholders are an integral part 
of a project manager’s function (PMI, 2013), the extent 
varies according to context. Sometimes ITPMs need to 
share information about risks with others, for example, 
to ensure that all team members’ actions are aligned 
(Gemmer, 1997). Yet, at other times, ITPMs opt for 
deliberate risk denial—i.e., the refusal to reveal risk 
information that could have a negative connotation 
(Kutsch & Hall, 2005)—because speaking about risks 
can create unnecessary anxiety among stakeholders 
(Kutsch & Hall, 2005). Behavioral involvement refers 
to the extent to which ITPMs need to collaborate with 
other stakeholders in deciding about and committing to 
risk responses. It comprises but surpasses 
informational involvement. Behavioral involvement is 
low when risk responses are within the control of 
ITPMs or when stakeholders refrain from responding 
unless risk actually materializes (Kutsch & Hall, 2010) 
rather than proactively managing risks. However, 
behavioral involvement is strong, for example, when 
ITPMs need the explicit support and authorization of 
top management (Kutsch et al., 2013; Whittaker, 
1999), when the requisite resources for risk response 
must be provided by other stakeholders (e.g., peer 
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managers), and when risk response can change the fate 
of (troubled) projects (Taylor, 2007).  
We postulate that stakeholders’ involvement decreases 
the relative action impetus of intuition. First, when 
informational involvement is low, risk communication 
is not a concern, and intuition suffices. However, when 
informational involvement is strong, convincing 
communications are required to leave no doubt about 
risk estimates’ credibility (Gemmer, 1997; Kutsch & 
Hall, 2010), and thus deliberate analysis outperforms 
intuition. Intuition is hard to communicate to others 
because it is often nonconscious and creates the 
impression of knowing about something but not about 
why this knowledge exists (Salas et al., 2010). In 
contrast, deliberate analysis provides a shared 
language to communicate about risks with 
stakeholders (de Bakker et al., 2011). Similarly, IS 
research has shown that a common belief is that 
decisions made using deliberate analysis can be 
defended even when they are wrong, while intuition is 
quasi-unjustifiable even when it would lead to the right 
decision (Drummond, 1996). Second, when behavioral 
involvement is low, ITPMs personally lead risk 
response enactment without the need to collaborate 
with many others. However, when behavioral 
involvement is strong, ITPMs need to credibly 
communicate not only that risks are pertinent but also 
that certain risk mitigations should be enacted (Kutsch 
& Hall, 2005); otherwise, stakeholders are likely to 
withhold cooperation (Kutsch & Hall, 2010). Given the 
low relative impetus of intuition when risk 
management is collaborative, it is common for people 
to do analyses to defend their intuition, especially 
when they are legally responsible for the decision 
(Gigerenzer, 2007). In this regard, Baskerville and 
Stage (1996, p. 484) suggest: “The probability 
arithmetic [used for a normative risk assessment] is 
the language for expressing a subjective, but well-
founded, professional opinion”. 
Proposition 3:  Project stakeholders’ involvement 
has a negative effect on the relative performance 
of intuition compared to deliberate analysis for 
risk assessment.  
Methods-using Pressures. Methods-using pressures 
refer to credible pressures from key stakeholders to 
apply deliberate, often formal, risk assessment 
practices, especially when deciding upon risk response 
enactment. Methods-using pressures can be direct or 
indirect. Direct (i.e., injunctive) pressures refer to the 
extent to which using a specific analytical tool (e.g., 
software) or technique (e.g., brainstorming sessions) is 
mandated. For example, some stakeholders (e.g., upper 
management or the project management office) might 
expect ITPMs to perform formal risk assessment and 
enforce this through control and governance 
mechanisms to arrive at higher levels of risk 
management maturity or in response to environmental 
pressures such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (Mignerat & 
Rivard, 2012). Indirect pressures refer to the 
organizational routines of risk management (Kutsch et 
al., 2013) or risk management best practices (e.g., in 
PMI’s PMBoK, 2013). Such pressures usually stem 
from the norms that have been created by 
institutionalized risk management practices 
(Mignerat & Rivard, 2012).  
We propose that methods-using pressures decrease the 
relative action impetus of intuition. When methods-
using pressures are weak, ITPMs are not concerned 
with complying with any specific risk assessment 
norms; therefore, intuitions are strong enough to 
motivate (or prevent) risk response enactment. 
However, when such pressures are strong, ITPMs are 
likely to try to satisfy key project stakeholders’ 
requests especially for a sensitive function such as risk 
assessment. Indeed, ITPMs are found to believe that 
“in order to be recognised and accepted by customers 
and other stakeholders, there was an expectation and 
pressure to conform to the prescribed routine of risk 
management” (Kutsch et al., 2013, p. 7). In a similar 
vein, the decision-making literature suggests that the 
use of intuition decreases when people are instructed 
to use the provided criteria for decision-making 
(Dane et al., 2012). 
Proposition 4:  Methods-using pressures have a 
negative effect on the relative performance of 
intuition compared to deliberate analysis for risk 
assessment.  
5.3 ITPMs’ Characteristics 
Project-specific Expertise. The model emphasizes the 
role of an ITPM’s characteristics—in particular, project-
specific expertise—in influencing the relative performance 
of intuition over deliberate analysis, both directly and as a 
moderator of the influence of the other antecedents. 
Building on the notion of expertise-based intuition 
(Salas et al., 2010), we define project-specific 
expertise as the extent to which an ITPM has 
developed a deep and rich knowledge base from 
extensive experience in managing similar IT projects. 
ITPMs vary in their project-specific expertise based on 
their experience in managing similar projects (Huff 
& Prybutok, 2008) and the training they receive in 
the technical (domain knowledge) and managerial 
aspects of such projects (e.g., formal training on 
agile software development). 
Understanding the relationship between project-
specific expertise and the performance of intuition 
requires the knowledge of how intuition works. 
Intuition uses pattern recognition—i.e., one estimates 
the outcome of a current situation by identifying and 
inferring from similar cases in the past. First, one must 
possess a rich subjective sample of cause-effects. 
Second, one must possess and use heuristics, defined 
Journal of the Association for Information Systems 
 
261 
 
as mental shortcuts for information storage and 
retrieval (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Heuristics 
work through attribute-substitution, whereby one 
answers a difficult question using an accessible answer 
to a related but easier question. Here accessibility 
refers to “the ease (or effort) with which particular 
mental contents come to mind” (Kahneman & 
Frederick, 2005, p. 271). Heuristics are of several 
kinds, and their effectiveness varies across contexts. In 
the present context, using intuition involves applying 
certain heuristics to an ITPM’s subjective sample of 
what can go wrong with each IT project scenario (Huff 
& Prybutok, 2008; Lyytinen et al., 1998). For example, 
to estimate how risky a project may be, an ITPM might 
use the availability heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1974) by referring to his or her easily-retrievable 
knowledge of the number of recent occurrences of 
similar troublesome projects. 
We posit that project-specific expertise increases the 
relative estimation accuracy of intuition in two ways. 
First, low expertise involves possessing a small sample 
of relevant cause-effects and thus immature intuition 
(Salas et al., 2010). In this case, deliberate analysis 
(e.g., using standard risk checklists) is likely to identify 
a wider array of pertinent risks. However, as ITPMs 
become experts, they develop a richer knowledge base 
about what will happen in each project scenario (Huff 
& Prybutok, 2008). Indeed, IS researchers have found 
that experts are not influenced by the use of risk 
assessment tools because they already possess relevant 
knowledge of the risk sources (Du et al., 2007). 
Second, low project-specific expertise involves not 
only lacking various heuristics that could be learned 
through experience or formal training, but also 
inexperience with how to properly use the heuristics. 
However, experienced individuals know how to select 
relevant heuristics that they have accumulated 
through past risk encounters (Gigerenzer & 
Gaissmaier, 2011), especially by learning from their 
errors (Huff & Prybutok, 2008). 
We also posit that project-specific expertise increases 
the relative efficiency of intuition in two ways. First, 
heuristics are effort-reducing strategies (Shah & 
Oppenheimer, 2008) because they seek accessible 
answers to difficult questions. With low expertise, the 
subjective sample is deficient; yet, high expertise 
increases the accessibility of answers, since several 
related items of information will be available in the 
subjective sample. Second, with low project-specific 
expertise, selecting and using heuristics might still be 
effortful. However, with repeated practice, the use of 
heuristics becomes subconscious, contributing to a 
characterizing aspect of intuition (i.e., automaticity; 
Dane & Pratt, 2007).  
Proposition 5: Project-specific expertise has a positive 
impact on the relative performance of intuition 
compared to deliberate analysis for risk assessment. 
We also posit that the effect of the other antecedents of 
the relative performance of intuition compared to 
deliberate analysis is influenced by project-specific 
expertise. Thus, we postulate: 
Proposition 6: Project-specific expertise moderates 
the effect of risks’ temporal complexity, risks’ 
structural complexity, project stakeholders’ 
involvement, and methods-using pressures on the 
relative performance of intuition compared to 
deliberate analysis for risk assessment.  
More precisely, without expertise, ITPMs might not be 
familiar with the possible emergent risks or sense the 
imminence of risk events. Consequently, the pattern 
recognition mechanism of intuition is less likely to identify 
such risks, leading to a weaker relative performance of 
intuition than deliberate analysis. With project-specific 
expertise, however, intuition is sensitized to identify 
emerging risks, and it works more automatically. 
Proposition 6a:  Project-specific expertise of ITPMs 
moderates the positive effect of risks’ temporal 
complexity on the relative performance of intuition 
compared to deliberate analysis for risk assessment.  
We suggest that the impact of project risks’ structural 
complexity on the relative performance of intuition 
depends on project-specific expertise. When project 
managers lack expertise, their intuition is immature 
(Salas et al., 2010), especially when they do not 
possess the subjective sample required to perform the 
pattern recognition that can deal with complex project 
risks in a rapid manner. However, “in practice, 
experienced project managers of complex and 
uncertain software projects may rely more on their 
expert knowledge and judgment than on [the] 
prescribed rational frameworks” (Taylor, 2007, p. 2). 
Proposition 6b:  Project-specific expertise of ITPMs 
moderates the positive effect of risks’ structural 
complexity on the relative performance of intuition 
compared to deliberate analysis for risk assessment.  
We further posit that the negative impact of project 
stakeholders’ involvement on the relative performance 
of intuition is weakened by ITPMs’ project-specific 
expertise. Project-specific expertise improves ITPMs’ 
communication of their intuition in two ways. First, for 
a risk message to be effective, the credibility of the 
message source is crucial (Williams & Noyes, 2007). 
Having high project-specific expertise can bring such 
credibility to ITPMs because expertise is among the 
strongest correlates of project managers’ perceived 
effectiveness ratings (Thamhain & Gemmill, 1974). 
Second, with high expertise, managers develop various 
tactics for communicating their intuition, for example, 
by copromoting their intuitive judgments in meetings 
(Constantiou, Shollo, & Vendel, 2016).  
Proposition 6c:  Project-specific expertise of ITPMs 
moderates the negative effect of project 
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stakeholders’ involvement on the relative 
performance of intuition compared to deliberate 
analysis for risk assessment.  
We also posit that the negative impact of methods-
using pressures on the relative performance of intuition 
is weakened by ITPMs’ project-specific expertise. 
Often, project managers lack formal authority and use 
other bases of influence. High project-specific 
expertise leads to having expert power, which “refers 
to the ability of a project manager to get those with 
whom he interfaces to do what he wants them to do 
because they attribute greater knowledge to him or 
believe he is more ‘qualified’ to evaluate the 
consequences of certain projects” (Wilemon & 
Gemmill, 1971, p. 323). As such, with significant 
expertise, an ITPM can circumvent the existing 
power structures in an organization, and intuition 
does not lose its relative action impetus as much as it 
would for a novice ITPM.  
Proposition 6d:  Project-specific expertise of ITPMs 
moderates the negative effect of methods-using 
pressures on the relative performance of intuition 
compared to deliberate analysis for risk assessment.  
6 Discussion 
6.1 Implications for Research and 
Practice 
The new bridging knowledge ensuing from the proposed 
theoretical model opens several avenues for future 
prescriptive research and has practical implications.   
When intuition outperforms deliberate analysis, 
researchers can derive more explicit prescriptions from 
the experiential knowledge of ITPMs. First, teaching 
materials can be designed to encourage ITPMs to 
acknowledge their intuitions. Some ways of doing so 
include inviting ITPMs to pay attention to the early 
warning signs they notice (Thamhain, 2013); 
documenting intuitions before starting deliberate 
analysis—for example, using risk checklists 
(Baskerville & Stage, 1996); and not simply 
disregarding intuitions if the output of the tool has 
suggested a different estimate (Drummond, 1996). 
Second, ITPMs’ intuition can be improved by 
enhancing the heuristics they use. For instance, EUT 
motivates the use of risk exposure to prioritize risk 
sources. Yet, to complement this, other heuristics such 
as fluency (i.e., prioritizing the most salient risk 
sources that come to mind) and tallying (i.e., counting 
the number of reasons each risk source might cause 
undesired events and prioritizing the risk sources with 
the highest count) (Gigerenzer, 2008) could be further 
validated and promoted when designing risk 
assessment techniques or training programs. Third, 
guidelines can be developed to help ITPMs reduce the 
biases of their heuristics in terms of the risk sources 
identified and the risk level estimated. In the design of 
risk assessment training programs, it could be relevant 
to include a learning outcome about increasing the 
ITPMs’ self-awareness regarding the ways in which 
intuition can be used with reduced bias.  
When deliberate analysis outperforms intuition, 
researchers can design interventions to encourage 
ITPMs to rely more on normative knowledge. 
Researchers can design tools that screen ITPMs based 
on the contingencies under which deliberate analysis 
outperforms intuition; and, if these conditions are met, 
they can encourage ITPMs to continue using the tools 
for risk assessment and to rely upon their output for 
risk response. In doing so—keeping in mind that it is 
essential to design interventions that correspond to 
managerial thinking (March & Shapira, 1987)—risk 
assessment tools could be designed (e.g., using better 
data visualization) to focus attention on important 
aspects of information via formatting (Williams & 
Noyes, 2007), which would consider the usability 
issues associated with risk assessment tools (Taylor et 
al., 2012). While this would increase the practicality of 
these tools, it could also contribute to modifying the 
managerial perspective through training ITPMs to use 
normative prescriptions (March & Shapira, 1987).  
6.2 Limitations 
Our work has some limitations. First, we have studied 
risk response as an individual-level decision of ITPMs. 
Nonetheless, risk management is, at times, seen as a 
collective-level activity (Lim, Sia, & Yeow, 2011); 
thus, future studies at that level would be fruitful. 
Second, to create a balanced pool of papers, we 
reviewed some but not all of the normative papers. 
Although we reached saturation in our analysis, further 
research could explore the other papers for additional 
insights. Third, as with any similar exercise, our coding 
process might be deemed subjective. To address this 
issue, we attempted to make this process as coherent as 
possible by discussing various manifestations of each 
assumption and extracting the supporting excerpts. 
Nevertheless, other researchers might be able to 
articulate additional or even different underlying 
assumptions, for example, by grouping the 
manifestations into different assumptions during the 
axial and selective coding steps. Finally, we have 
assumed risk management to be purposeful by defining 
risk assessment performance as an activity that 
contributes to project success. However, ITPMs can 
use risk assessment for selective reporting (Iacovou, 
Thompson, & Smith, 2009) or for deliberate 
stakeholder deception (Kutsch & Hall, 2005), which 
we deemed out of the scope of experiential knowledge. 
Future research could explore those aspects.  
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6.3 Contributions 
Notwithstanding these limitations, our study makes 
several contributions. First, we provide a foundation 
for future bridging research on IT project risk 
management by offering a model that reconciles two 
seemingly contrasting bodies of knowledge. Second, 
we unearth common conceptualizations and 
overarching process and variance models from the 
normative and experiential bodies of knowledge and 
we provide a set of conceptual assumptions specific to 
each stance. By doing so, we contribute to the ongoing 
discussion of the assumptions underlying the IT project 
risk management literature (e.g., de Bakker et al., 
2010). Overall, we contribute to IT project risk 
management research programs (e.g., Sauer et al., 
2008) by calling for more incorporation of the 
experiential phenomena of decision-making into this 
stream of research. We try to stimulate interest in this 
relevant area by showcasing how a dialectical tension 
could be addressed by theorizing. 
Moreover, we make a methodological contribution by 
offering a three-step dialectical review approach. In 
particular, we contribute to the research on examining 
assumptions (e.g., Alvesson & Sandberg, 2011; Davis, 
1971) by adapting the grounded theory literature 
review method (Wolfswinkel et al., 2013). In doing so, 
we propose and showcase that the dialectical 
interrogation mechanism of problematization can be 
implemented using the coding techniques of grounded 
theorizing. We suggest treating the papers as data, 
manifestations of their assumptions as open codes 
close to the data, and assumptions as higher-level 
(axial/selective) codes.  
7 Concluding Remarks 
Using a theme-based review, we delineated two bodies 
of knowledge—normative and behavioral—within the 
IT project risk management literature, and we 
synthesized what has been learned from each. 
Contrastation led us to identify several dialectical 
tensions between the assumptions of the two bodies of 
knowledge on key issues such as the relative 
importance of the probability and impact dimensions 
of risk exposure and the relative importance of various 
determinants to be considered for a risk response 
decision. Given that risk assessment is often a key basis 
for any risk response action, one tension appeared 
particularly relevant—that of the relative performance 
of intuition compared to deliberate analysis. We 
addressed this tension in the sublation step of our 
study. To do this, we adopted one of Poole and Van de 
Ven’s (1989) recommendations of building upon 
oppositions, tensions, and contradictions by finding a 
new perspective that could eliminate existing 
oppositions. We thus developed a theoretical model of 
the contingencies under which each approach can 
perform better. The model suggests that ITPMs’ 
project-specific expertise, risks’ temporal complexity, 
risks’ structural complexity, stakeholders’ 
involvement in risk management, and methods-using 
pressures explain the relative performance of intuition 
and deliberate analysis for risk assessment. Moreover, 
the model suggests that project-specific expertise plays 
a key role by moderating all the other proposed effects. 
Given the applied nature of risk management research, 
we discuss several avenues for developing future 
prescriptive research, and we suggest testing the model 
as a key step in this direction. 
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Appendix A: Coding Scheme for Research Objectives 
Guided by our understanding of the two bodies of knowledge, and to create a manageable but balanced pool of papers, 
we coded the papers on the basis of their key research objective as pertaining to chiefly normative or experiential 
knowledge. If a paper has both objectives at the same time or the objectives cannot be separated, we coded the paper 
as mixed. The table below presents our coding scheme. 
Table A1. Coding Scheme for Research Objectives 
Body of knowledge Normative Experiential 
Theme 
focus 
Overarching questions Overarching questions 
• How to further build on and advance 
decision-theoretic knowledge in order to 
have higher chances of project success?  
• Are the resulting prescriptions indeed 
effective? Why? 
• How do ITPMs actually manage project 
risks in practice?  
• Are these behaviors different from the 
prescriptions derived from normative 
knowledge? Why? 
Specific questions Specific questions 
Core 
constructs 
Risk  
How to conceptualize project risks according 
to the classical decision theories? 
How do ITPMs conceptualize and perceive 
risks?  
What are the key specific risk sources and 
events? 
What are the key risk sources and events that 
ITPMs see in IT projects? How do they differ 
from the ones in the literature? 
How should risks be assessed? 
How and why do ITPMs’ perceptions of risks 
differ from that of other entities (e.g., other 
stakeholders)?  
Risk 
response 
What are the key risk responses that should 
be enacted to cope which each specific risk 
source or event?  
What are the key risk responses that ITPMs 
actually use (or do not use) in IT projects?  
How should appropriate risk responses be 
selected for specific risks? 
How and why are the decisions of whether or 
not to enact these responses different from 
normative prescriptions? 
Research 
models 
Process 
models 
What are the key formal steps that should be 
taken in project risk management? 
What are the steps that ITPMs actually take 
when managing risks?  
How and why does applying formal risk 
management processes influence project 
success? 
How and why do ITPMs disengage from 
applying risk management practices? 
Variance 
models  
What constitutes a risk with a negative 
impact on project success? What influences ITPMs risk perceptions? 
What determines a good risk response? What influences ITPMs risk response enactment? 
What is the impact of applying formal risk 
management processes on project success? 
What motivates ITPMs to apply (or disengage 
from applying) formal risk management 
practices? 
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Appendix B: Details on the Investigated Papers 
Table B1. Details on Investigated Papers 
Study Journal 
Citation 
count  
(Oct. 2016) 
Studies with a research objective pertaining to normative knowledge 
Barki et al. (1993) Journal of Management Information Systems 811 
Barki et al. (2001) Journal of Management Information Systems 447 
Baskerville & Stage (1996) MIS Quarterly 159 
Boehm (1991) IEEE Software 1831 
Ehie & Madsen (2005) Computers in Industry 415 
Fairley (1994) IEEE Software 235 
Gemino et al. (2008) Journal of Management Information Systems 112 
Han & Huang (2007) Journal of Systems and Software 206 
Heemstra & Kusters (1996) Journal of Information Technology 89 
Huang et al. (2004) Industrial Management & Data Systems 243 
Jiang & Klein (1999) Information & Management 184 
Jiang & Klein (2000) Journal of Systems and Software 216 
Jiang et al. (2006) Journal of the Association for Information Systems 92 
Keil et al. (1998) Communications of the ACM 831 
Lyytinen et al. (1996) Journal of Information Technology 106 
Mursu et al. (2003) European Journal of Information Systems 57 
Nidumolu (1995) Information Systems Research 538 
Nidumolu (1996) Journal of Management Information Systems 219 
Powell & Klein (1996) Journal of Information Technology 61 
Saarinen & Vepsäläinen (1993) European Journal of Information Systems 37 
Schmidt et al. (2001) Journal of Management Information Systems 1092 
Scott & Vessey (2002) Communications of the ACM 414 
Sherer & Alter (2004) Communications of the AIS 123 
Sumner (2000) Journal of Information Technology 631 
Tesch et al. (2007) Journal of Computer Information Systems 125 
Wallace & Keil (2004) Communications of the ACM 322 
Wallace et al. (2004a) Decision Sciences 425 
Wallace et al. (2004b) Information & Management 392 
Whittaker (1999) Information Management & Computer Security 286 
Willcocks & Margetts (1994) European Journal of Information Systems 169 
Yetton et al. (2000) Information Systems Journal 144 
Average citations of studies with a normative research objective 355.2 
Studies with a mixed research objective 
Addison & Vallabh (2002) Other: Conference proceedings—SAICSIT 2002 145 
Armour (2005) Communications of the ACM 23 
Baccarini et al. (2004) Industrial Management & Data Systems 229 
Bannerman (2008) Journal of Systems and Software 273 
Bussen & Myers (1997) Journal of Information Technology 106 
Charette (1996b) IEEE Software 112 
Charette (1996a) Journal of Information Technology 64 
Charette (2005) IEEE Spectrum 272 
de Bakker et al. (2010) International Journal of Project Management 213 
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de Bakker et al. (2011) Project Management Journal 31 
de Bakker et al. (2012) International Journal of Project Management 36 
Lyytinen & Robey (1999) Information Systems Journal 438 
Lyytinen et al. (1998) Information Systems Research 358 
McGrew & Bilotta (2000) Management Decision 37 
Ropponen & Lyytinen (1997) European Journal of Information Systems 99 
Ropponen & Lyytinen (2000) IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering 396 
Smith et al. (2001) Communications of the AIS 48 
Williams et al. (1997) IEEE Software 83 
Average citations of studies with a mixed research objective 164.6 
Studies with a research objective pertaining to experiential knowledge 
Carr (1997) IEEE Software 23 
Drummond (1996) Journal of Information Technology 88 
Du et al. (2007) Decision Support Systems 55 
Gemmer (1997) IEEE Software 76 
Glass (1999) Communications of the ACM 87 
Huff & Prybutok (2008) Project Management Journal 23 
Jani (2011) International Journal of Project Management 46 
Keil et al. (2000) Journal of Systems and Software 139 
Keil et al. (2002) Information Systems Journal 209 
Keil et al. (2008) Journal of Systems and Software 71 
Kutsch & Hall (2005) International Journal of Project Management 95 
Kutsch & Hall (2009) Project Management Journal 34 
Kutsch & Hall (2010) International Journal of Project Management 129 
Kutsch & Maylor (2011) International Journal of Project Organisation and Management 3 
Kutsch et al. (2013) European Journal of Information Systems 11 
Kutsch et al. (2014) Research-Technology Management 9 
Lauer (1996) Journal of Information Technology 22 
Lim et al. (2011) Journal of the Association for Information Systems 15 
Liu et al. (2010) Information Systems Journal 69 
Mignerat & Rivard (2012) Information and Organization 21 
Moynihan (1996) Journal of Information Technology 85 
Moynihan (1997) IEEE Software 159 
Moynihan (2000) Journal of Systems and Software 28 
Moynihan (2002) Information & Management 31 
Pablo (1999) Journal of Managerial Psychology 53 
Pfleeger (2000) Journal of Systems and Software 79 
Ropponen (1999) Other: Book chapter 25 
Taylor (2005) International Journal of Project Management 27 
Taylor (2006) Project Management Journal 36 
Taylor (2007) Other: Conference Proceedings—ICIS 2007  5 
Taylor et al. (2012) Journal of Information Technology 33 
Average citations of studies with an experiential research objective 57.6 
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Appendix C: Synthesis of the Normative and Experiential Bodies of 
Knowledge 
Here we provide more details on our synthesis of the process and variance theories from the normative and experiential 
knowledge bases.
Table C1. Normative Knowledge: The Formal Risk Management Process 
Study 
Risk assessment Risk control 
S7: 
Process 
iteration 
S1: Risk 
identification 
S2: Risk 
analysis 
S3: Risk 
prioritization 
S4: Risk 
response 
planning 
S5: Risk 
response 
enactment 
S6:Risk 
monitoring  
Addison & Vallabh (2002) X X  X   X 
Baccarini et al. (2004) X X  X  X  
Bannerman (2008) X X  X  X X 
Baskerville & Stage (1996) X X X X   X 
Boehm (1991) X X X X  X X 
Charette (1996a) X X  X X X X 
de Bakker et al. (2010) X X X X  X X 
de Bakker et al. (2011) X X  X X X X 
de Bakker et al. (2012) X X  X    
Du et al. (2007) X   X    
Fairley (1994) X X  X  X X 
Heemstra & Kusters (1996) X X X X   X 
Jani (2011) X X      
Keil et al. (2008) X   X    
Kutsch & Hall (2009) X X  X  X  
Kutsch et al. (2014) X X X X    
Lim et al. (2011) X X  X   X 
Lyytinen et al. (1998) X X  X   X 
Mignerat and Rivard (2012) X X X   X  
Powell & Klein (1996) X X      
Ropponen (1999) X X  X    
Smith et al. (2001) X X  X   X 
Taylor (2007) X X X X    
Tesch et al. (2007) X X  X  X  
Williams et al. (1997) X X X X  X X 
Table C1 highlights the most pronounced risk management steps in the reviewed studies. Other steps not included in 
this table but mentioned by a few studies are:  
• a risk management planning (initiation) step mentioned by Baccarini et al. (2004), de Bakker et al. 
(2012), Kutsch and Hall (2009), and Tesch et al. (2007); 
• a risk categorization step after risk identification as proposed by Jani (2011) and Powell and Klein 
(1996); 
• a contingency planning step (separate from risk response planning) as discussed by Bannerman (2008) 
and Fairley (1994);  
• a crisis management step suggested by Fairley (1994); and 
• a separate risk communication and reporting step as recommended by Baccarini et al. (2004), 
Bannerman (2008), Boehm (1991), de Bakker et al. (2011), de Bakker et al. (2012), and Kutsch and 
Hall (2005). 
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Table C2. Normative Knowledge: Variance Studies 
Relationship Study 
Quantitative/ 
Qualitative/ 
Conceptual 
Quant. 
findings Comment 
R1 Risk  Project 
performance: 
Direct effect 
Charette (2005) Conceptual - Unmanaged risks lead to project failure. 
Ehie & Madsen 
(2005) Quantitative Mixed 
“There was a strong correlation between 
successfully implementing ERP and six out of the 
eight factors identified” (p. 545). 
Gemino et al. 
(2008) Quantitative Mixed 
Emergent risk factors influence only the project 
process performance, not the product performance. 
Han & Huang 
(2007) Quantitative Mixed 
Different risk factors influence high, medium, and 
low-performance software projects 
Jiang & Klein 
(1999) Quantitative Mixed 
“the various project risk variables are not equally 
important in influencing system success” (p. 268) 
Jiang & Klein 
(2000) Quantitative Mixed 
Some specific risks had an effect, but “The 
remaining risk factors did not relate to the overall 
measure of effectiveness” (p. 7). 
Nidumolu (1996) Quantitative Mixed 
See p. 99. The effect of requirement uncertainty on 
performance (process) is significant but on 
performance (product) is insignificant. 
Risk  Project 
performance: 
Mediated effect 
through 
intermediary 
risks  
Gemino et al. 
(2008) Quantitative Mixed 
“emergent risk factors cannot be, or are not 
currently, completely mitigated by project 
management practice” (p. 32) [partial mediation] 
Jiang et al. (2006) Quantitative Supported 
“(Residual performance risk) [was included] as an 
intermediate variable that was significantly related 
with project performance” (p. 81). 
Nidumolu (1995) Quantitative Supported 
“project uncertainty increased residual 
performance risk and reduced project 
performance” (p. 209) 
Nidumolu (1996) Quantitative Supported See p. 102. The effect of requirements uncertainty on software performance risk is significant. 
Bannerman (2008) Conceptual - See p. 2120. The influence of risk is mediated through vulnerabilities of the organization. 
Wallace et al. 
(2004a) Quantitative Supported 
See p. 304. Project management risk mediates 
social subsystem risk but not technical subsystem 
risk. 
R2 Fit  Project 
Performance Barki et al. (2001) Quantitative Supported Supported. 
R3 Risk responses 
 Project 
performance: 
Contingent 
effect  
Barki et al. (2001) Quantitative Supported 
“deviations from an ideal Risk Management 
Profile were negatively correlated with 
Performance” (p. 54) 
Risk responses 
 Project 
performance: 
Direct effect 
Gemino et al. 
(2008) Quantitative Supported 
“project management practices are significantly 
directly related to process and product 
performance” (p. 34) 
Jiang et al. (2006) Quantitative Supported “partnering significantly relates to higher user support, less residual risk” (p. 68) 
Nidumolu (1995) Quantitative Supported 
“higher levels of both vertical and horizontal 
coordination lead to higher levels of overall 
performance” (p. 191) 
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Table C2. Normative Knowledge: Variance Studies 
Nidumolu (1996) Quantitative Mixed 
The effect of vertical coordination on performance 
is insignificant, but that of horizontal coordination 
is significant. 
R4 Risk responses 
 Project 
performance: 
Mediate via 
residual risks 
 
Jiang et al. (2006) Quantitative Supported 
“partnering significantly relates to higher user 
support, less residual risk, and better project 
performance” (p. 68) 
Nidumolu (1995) Quantitative Supported 
“vertical coordination reduced residual 
performance risk, both directly and by reducing 
project uncertainty; consequently, it also 
significantly increased project performance, albeit 
indirectly” (p. 209) 
Risk responses 
 Residual risk  Ropponen & Lyytinen (1997) Quantitative Mixed 
“little support was found for the claim that specific 
risk management methods are instrumental in 
attacking specific software risks” (p. 41) 
Addison & Vallabh 
(2002) Quantitative Mixed 
“seven of the ten risk factors are reduced by the 
use of controls” (p. 139)  
R5 Residual risk  
Project 
performance 
Jiang et al. (2006) Quantitative Supported Supported. 
Nidumolu (1995) Quantitative Supported H3 is supported. 
Nidumolu (1996) Quantitative Mixed 
The effect of risk on performance (process) is 
significant but on performance (product) is 
insignificant. 
R6 Formal risk 
management  
Project 
performance: 
Indirect effect 
via residual risk 
Ropponen & 
Lyytinen (2000) Quantitative Mixed 
“general use of risk management methods” 
mitigates “requirements management risk” (p. 
103); “those who applied risk management 
methods continuously managed scheduling and 
timing risks significantly better” (p. 103) 
Formal risk 
management 
Project 
performance: 
Direct effect 
from the entire 
process  
Ropponen & 
Lyytinen (1997) Quantitative Supported 
“Our findings support in general the claim that the 
use of risk management methods improves system 
development performance” (p. 41). 
Boehm (1991) Conceptual - - 
Formal risk 
management 
Project 
performance: 
Direct effect 
from different 
steps (e.g., risk 
identification) 
de Bakker et al. 
(2012) Qualitative - 
“Risk identification and risk allocation are 
considered by stakeholders as contributing most 
often to project success…. Other risk management 
activities contribute less often to project 
success…except for risk management planning” 
(p. 451). 
McGrew & Bilotta 
(2000) Quantitative Supported 
In two projects, the “percent correct” of risk 
assessment and risk intervention is consistently 
more than 50%. 
de Bakker et al. 
(2011) Qualitative - 
“Analysis demonstrates stakeholders deliberately 
use risk management to convey messages to 
others…. Stakeholders perceive these effects as 
contributing to project success” (p. 75). 
de Bakker et al. 
(2012) Qualitative - 
“in addition to the instrumental effects of risk 
management, being direct risk mitigating actions 
by stakeholders, individual risk management 
activities are able to generate communicative 
effects” (p. 444) 
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Baskerville & 
Stage (1996) Qualitative - 
“the risk analysis technique succeeds as a helpful 
management tool, even though the project outcome 
may be failure” (p. 497) 
Formal risk 
management  
Project 
performance: 
Mediated by 
way of 
application 
Williams et al. 
(1997) Conceptual - 
The paper discusses the effective vs. ineffective 
ways to implement risks. 
Gemmer (1997) Conceptual - The paper discusses functional vs. dysfunctional risk management behaviors. 
Formal risk 
management  
Project 
performance: 
Moderated 
effect 
Ropponen & 
Lyytinen (1997) Quantitative Supported 
“risk management performance depends on several 
environmental contingencies. These include the 
size of the IS department, the project size, project 
management training, project managers’ 
experience, and the use of system development 
methods” (p. 46) 
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Table C3. Experiential Knowledge: Process Studies 
(Evidencing Risk Management Process Disengagement) 
Process 
disengagement stage Study 
Statistical/ 
Qualitative/ 
Conceptual 
Finding 
D0  From applying 
the risk 
management 
process 
Ropponen (1999) Quantitative “a large majority of project managers (62 observations = 75%) did not follow any detailed risk management approach” (p. 254) 
Fairly (1994) Conceptual “risk management is seldom applied as an explicit project-management activity” (p. 57) 
Bannerman (2008)  Quantitative 
“Formal risk management was practiced in five projects (29%), 
no risk management was practiced at all in another five (29%), 
while the remaining seven projects (41%) adopted a range of 
semi-formal or informal practices” (p. 2124). 
From a 
purposeful 
application 
(rather than for 
seeking 
legitimacy) 
Kutsch & Hall 
(2009) Quantitative 
“In over half of all cases, a PMI risk management process was 
used…. However, in one-third of the 102 cases, no formal 
project risk management approach was applied” (p. 78). 
Mignerat & Rivard 
(2012) Conceptual 
“three groups of practices—formal control, external integration 
and project risk management—have reached full 
institutionalization” (p. 126) 
D1 From risk 
identification  Ropponen (1999). Quantitative 
“75% of the respondents used checklists” but only 33% used 
often (p. 254). 
D2 From risk 
analysis Ropponen (1999) Quantitative 
See p. 254. Risk exposure was used by 20% of ITPMs, but only 
5% used often. 
de Bakker et al. 
(2012) Qualitative “Risk analysis was done in five of the seven projects” (p. 449). 
Baccarini et al. 
(2004) Conceptual 
“the OTR Group (1992) found that only 30 per cent of 
organisations applied risk analysis in their IT investment and 
project management processes” (p. 286) 
Bannerman (2008) Qualitative “No agency reported using quantitative risk assessment” (p. 2125). 
Armour (2005) Conceptual “many organizations…do not do an explicit risk calculation” (p. 19) 
Taylor (2005) Qualitative “none of the respondents carried out any quantitative assessments” (p. 441) 
Kutsch et al. 
(2013) Qualitative See p. 5. 
D3 From risk 
prioritization Bannerman (2008) Qualitative 
Respondents “were quite equivocal about how well the risks 
were prioritized” (p. 2124). 
D4 From risk 
response 
planning 
Kutsch & Hall 
2005 Qualitative 
ITPMs might not enact responses to risks because of some 
intervening conditions including denying uncertainty, avoiding 
uncertainty, delaying uncertainty, and ignoring uncertainty. 
Kutsch & Hall 
2010 Qualitative 
ITPMs might chose to deliberately ignore risks rather than 
enacting responses to them. 
Kutsch et al. 
(2014)  Quantitative 
“28 percent (44 risks) of the risks that made it through the 
earlier stages were not actively managed, even though 
managers had already invested effort in identifying and 
assessing them” (p. 28). 
de Bakker et al. 
(2012) Quantitative “Risk control is mentioned in six cases [out of seven]” (p. 449). 
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Table C3. Experiential Knowledge: Process Studies 
(Evidencing Risk Management Process Disengagement) 
D5 From risk 
response 
enactment 
Taylor (2005) Qualitative 
“The hand-over from pre-sales to implementation teams was 
often a weak link, with project managers failing to follow-up 
risk management plans prepared at pre-sales stage” (p. 437). 
D6 From risk 
monitoring  Taylor (2005) Qualitative 
“Respondents did not appear to use the pre-sales risk 
assessment to warn them about specific potential problems that 
they should watch out for” (p. 441). 
D7 From iterating 
the process over 
the course of 
the project 
 
Bannerman (2008) Qualitative 
“project management practices tended to wane as the project 
progressed” (p. 2124); “risk management practice was often not 
sustained throughout the whole project” (p. 2131) 
Taylor (2005) Qualitative “Many of the respondents did not regard risk assessment as an on-going project activity” (p. 442). 
Carr (1997)  Conceptual 
“for the most part risk identification and analysis is performed 
on an ad hoc basis, generally at the beginning of the project” (p. 
24) 
de Bakker et al. 
(2010)  Conceptual 
“the sequence of identification, analysis, responses, and 
monitoring is often not followed” (p. 500) 
de Bakker et al. 
(2011) Qualitative 
“Project 2 did not follow the sequence of risk management 
practices” (p. 82). 
S1 Deliberate risk 
ignorance 
Kutsch & Hall 
(2005) Qualitative - 
Kutsch & Hall 
(2010) Qualitative - 
Kutsch et al. 
(2013) Qualitative - 
S2 Intuitive risk 
management 
Baskerville & 
Stage (1996) Qualitative - 
Drummond (1996) Qualitative - 
Ropponen (1999) Quantitative - 
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Table C4. Experiential Knowledge: Variance Studies 
Relationship Study 
Quantitative/ 
Qualitative/ 
Conceptual 
Quant. 
findings Comment 
P1 Risk checklists 
 Risk 
perception in 
terms of covered 
risks  
Lyytinen et al. 
(1998) Conceptual - 
Four different checklists shape ITPMs’ attention to 
differing risk factors. 
Du et al. (2007) Quantitative Mixed Dual effects: Risk checklists helped novice ITPMs identify some risks but blinded them to other risks. 
Risk checklists 
 Risk 
perception in 
terms of risk 
extent  
Keil et al. (2008) Quantitative Supported 
“the risk checklist helped subjects identify more 
risks than they would identify without the aid of a 
checklist” (p. 908) 
Du et al. (2007) Quantitative Supported 
A significant but very small effect: “the effect of 
the risk assessment tool on risk perception...was 
small” (p. 277). 
Du et al. (2007) Quantitative No Support “risk perceptions for experts were not influenced by use of the tool” (p. 279) 
Provided risk 
information  
Risk perception 
Keil et al. (2000) Quantitative Supported Two provided information items are on the probability and magnitude of impact of risks.  
P2 Risk propensity 
 Risk 
perception 
Du et al. (2007) Quantitative Supported See p. 276. 
Keil et al. (2008) Quantitative No support 
“Contrary to our hypothesis, subjects who 
identified more risks were no more risk-averse than 
the subjects who identified fewer risks” (p. 914). 
Keil et al. (2000) Quantitative No support See p. 151. 
Expertise  
Risk perception  Du et al. (2007) Quantitative Mixed See p. 277 (novices vs. experts).  
Role  Risk 
perception 
Keil et al. (2008) Quantitative No support See p. 913 (Inside ITPMs vs. outside consultants). 
Keil et al. (2002) Quantitative Supported ITPMs vs. users. 
Self-efficacy  
Risk perception Jani (2011) Quantitative Supported Task-specific self-efficacy (-) 
Cultural 
differences  
Risk perception 
in terms of 
covered risks 
Ropponen (1999) Quantitative Supported - 
Liu et al. (2010) Quantitative Supported - 
Mursu et al. 
(2003) Quantitative Supported 
“When we compare the ranked list of factors in 
Nigeria with the earlier ranked lists of factors, 
some important differences emerge” (p. 187) 
Perceived 
control  Risk 
perception 
Jani (2011) Quantitative Supported 
Perceived control over risks - Exogenous risk (+) 
or  
endogenous risk (-) 
Schmidt et al. 
2001 Quantitative Supported 
In terms of risk factor rankings, they find that 
“Perceived level of control relates clearly with 
cultural differences in individualism, power 
distance, and uncertainty avoidance”   (p. 24). 
Du et al. (2007) Quantitative Supported See p. 278 (perceived control over project—internal vs. outsourced project) 
P3 Risk perception 
 Risk response 
Jani (2011,)  Quantitative Supported See p. 940. 
Keil et al. (2000) Quantitative Mixed See p. 151. 
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Table C4. Experiential Knowledge: Variance Studies 
 
Du et al. (2007) Quantitative No S=support 
“Surprisingly, however, the difference in risk 
perception does not translate into differences in 
subsequent decisions on how to continue a project” 
(p. 280). 
Drummond 
(1996) Qualitative - 
The project was simply continued despite 
significant risks. 
P4 Risk checklists 
 Risk 
response: In 
terms of 
response type 
Lyytinen et al. 
(1998) Conceptual - 
Four different checklists shape ITPMs’ attention to 
differing risk responses. 
Risk checklists 
 Risk 
response: In 
terms of 
response 
enactment 
Du et al. (2007) Quantitative Supported “the effect of the risk assessment tool on...decision-making behavior was small” (p. 277) 
Du et al. (2007) Quantitative Mixed 
“the effect of the risk assessment tool on decision-
making behavior was significant for novices, but 
not for experts” (p. 277) 
P5 Risk propensity 
 Risk response 
Du et al. (2007) Quantitative Supported See p. 276. 
Huff & Prybutok 
(2008) Quantitative Mixed 
See p. 40 (Supported for two scenarios and not 
supported for one scenario). 
Jani (2011)  Quantitative Mixed - 
Keil et al. (2000) Quantitative No Support See p. 151. 
Problem context 
 Risk response Lauer (1996) Quantitative Supported Gain or loss context 
Reference point 
 Risk response  Lauer (1996) Quantitative Supported Initial project endowment 
Problem framing 
 Risk response Lauer (1996) Quantitative Supported Different representations of the same problem 
Expertise/ 
Experience  
Risk response 
Du et al. (2007) Quantitative No Support See p. 277 (expertise: novice vs. expert). 
Huff & Prybutok 
(2008) Quantitative Mixed 
See p. 39 (Task-specific experience—supported for 
two scenarios, not supported at 5% level for one 
scenario). 
Huff & Prybutok 
(2008) Quantitative No support See p. 39 (total work experience). 
Role  Risk 
response Keil et al. (2008) Quantitative No support 
See p. 913 (inside project manager vs. outside 
consultant). 
Perceived 
control over 
project  Risk 
response 
Du et al. (2007) Quantitative Supported See p. 277 (internal vs. outsourced projects). 
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Appendix D: Initial Codes 
As the first step in identifying key assumptions, the initial codes were identified by searching for the terms “assume”, 
“assumption”, and “premise” in the pool of papers, reading the papers that discuss these assumptions, and converting 
relevant excerpts to initial open codes before creating the manifestations. This process was guided by a knowledge of 
influential papers on risk management assumptions outside the IS domain (e.g., March & Shapira, 1987). 
 
Table D1. Initial Codes 
Initial code Relevant final manifestation 
“IT project managers focus on a few factors and largely ignore others” (Taylor et al., 2012, p. 19). A 
“Expected utility theory (EUT)…provides the fundamental assumptions that underline project risk 
management: …perfect information about all of the relevant variables in terms of both quantity and 
quality; …perfect knowledge of the future consequences of each possible solution and their implications 
for the project” (Kutsch & Hall, 2009, pp. 73-74). 
A 
“The premise behind risk management within the context of IT-project management is that…it is 
feasible to identify problems before they occur” (Heemstra & Kusters, 1996, p. 333). A/not used 
“It is assumed that specific risks to a project can be identified, and that their probability and impact can 
be quantified” (Taylor et al., 2012, p. 19). B 
“The assumption is that risk assessment tools will provide managers with more accurate perceptions of 
risk, thereby allowing them to make better informed decisions and ensuring more successful outcomes” 
(Du et al., 2007, pp. 269-270). 
A, B 
“The underpinning assumption is that projects are comparable in the sense that information about risks 
can be generalised and is used in future projects” (de Bakker et al., 2010, p. 494). A, B 
“the assumption that the use of such devices will lead to more accurate risk perceptions that will, in turn, 
lead to more appropriate decisions regarding project initiation and continuation” (Keil et al., 2000, p. 
145) 
B, C 
“The evaluation approach assumes that known risk factors are used in the current project, contributing to 
the management of the project and as a result to positive project outcomes” (de Bakker et al., 2010, p. 
495). 
C 
“The recommendations also assume that project managers will, indeed, evaluate the probability and 
impact of each risk in order to develop a risk management plan” (Taylor et al., 2012, p. 19). B, C 
“in practice, the likelihood of outcomes and their impacts tend to enter into managers’ calculations of 
risk independently, rather than as their products” (Bannerman, 2008, p. 2119) F, H 
“They [ITPMs] also tend to prefer verbal characterizations of risk than probabilistic representations 
because they are skeptical that the broad dimensionality of risk can be reduced to a single number” 
(Bannerman, 2008, p. 2119). 
F, H 
“though quantities may be involved in assessing the level of risk, there is little desire to reduce risk to a 
single construct of outcomes” (Lyytinen et al., 1998, p. 235) F, H 
“managers follow a less precise calculus” (Lyytinen et al., 1998, p. 235) F, H 
“Managers see risk in less precise ways” (Bannerman, 2008, p. 2119). F, H 
“it is very difficult in practice to estimate the probability of impact of many risk factors, especially in 
software projects” (Bannerman, 2008, p. 2119) F, H 
“managers neither understand, nor care to use precise probability estimates: crude characterizations are 
used to exclude certain possibilities from the decision” (Lyytinen et al., 1998, p. 235) F, G 
“many of the risks in IT projects are not aleatoric in nature (they are not based on probability), but 
epistemic, which means that there is not enough information available to take a decision” (de Bakker et 
al., 2010, p. 500) 
G 
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Appendix E: Manifestations of the Assumptions 
Initial codes (see Appendix D) were purified and used as part of open coding; but when they did not fit the data, we 
created new open codes to stay close to the data. The open codes were later grouped into what we call “manifestations”, 
and these manifestations were then abstracted to create the assumptions in a bottom-up fashion. The tables below list 
these manifestations for each—normative and experiential—assumption and provide some explanations and examples 
from the literature. 
Table E1. Manifestations of the Normative Assumption 
Manifestation Explanation and example 
A: Deliberate analysis covers 
a wider range of relevant 
risks than intuition. 
In applying the classical decision theories such as expected utility theory (EUT), the normative 
body of knowledge builds on the notion of bounded rationality which suggests that “the actor has 
only incomplete information” (Simon, 1972, p. 163). As March (1978) notes, researchers have 
responded to bounded rationality by developing knowledge bases that store information from 
past experiences to create an intelligence that informs future decision-making.  
We extracted 13 excerpts (from 11 papers) that have explicitly mentioned storing and retrieving 
risk information using such knowledge bases as a way of identifying more risks. For example, 
Wallace et al. (2004a, p. 307), discussing the instrument they developed, suggest that 
“practitioners can use the instrument to develop historical databases of the risks associated with 
different projects and their outcome. Compilation of this information could provide a means of 
assessing future projects”. Likewise, Schmidt et al. (2001, p. 8) argue that “with a risk factor 
checklist, project managers can avoid overlooking some risk factors”.  
Moreover, we found 25 excerpts (13 papers) that implicitly support this manifestation by 
focusing on using or developing risk lists to help researchers measure risks in specific projects 
and/or to help ITPMs measure risks. 
B: Using deliberate analysis 
increases the accuracy of risk 
estimates. 
We found 3 excerpts (from 3 papers) that explicitly mention the higher accuracy of analytical 
estimates. Keil et al. (2000) explicitly point to the existence of this manifestation in the literature: 
“To help managers appraise project risk more accurately, IS researchers have developed a variety 
of risk assessment tools including checklists and surveys. Implicit in this line of research, 
however, is the assumption that the use of such devices will lead to more accurate risk 
perceptions” (p. 145). For example, Charette (1996a, p. 375) states that “A key element to the 
accuracy (and precision) of the estimates will be whether there exists historical data to draw 
upon—the quality of the whole analysis process depends on the quality of the data”.  
We coded 13 excerpts (9 papers) that refer to the biases of intuition (i.e., systematic deviations 
from perfect identification of risk sources and evaluation of risk exposure—e.g., those performed 
by impartial risk experts who have perfect knowledge of outcome distribution and follow a 
prescribed calculus). For example, Jani (2011) states: “Results of this study point to a ‘self-
efficacy bias’ where project managers with higher self-efficacy may underestimate the risks of a 
troubled IT project as compared to project managers with lower self-efficacy” (p. 934). 
We also found an additional 35 excerpts (from 21 papers) that implicitly support this 
manifestation by discussing how to estimate risks analytically, considering that decision makers 
may approximate the information about the decision outcomes (March, 1978). For example, first, 
the range of possible undesired outcomes is approximated by a list of risk sources. Then, the 
probability of overall undesired outcomes is approximated by either counting the number of 
present risk sources (e.g., Keil et al., 2008) or by rating the strength of each risk source and then 
aggregating these strengths using statistical methods (e.g., Wallace et al., 2004b). We also note 
that this approach has been not only prescribed but also used in research. For instance, to measure 
risk (i.e., the probability of an undesired outcome) or risk exposure (i.e., probability and 
magnitude of undesired outcomes), several researchers (e.g. Barki et al., 2001) have used proxy 
measures (e.g., a formative index of risk sources) rather than direct reflective indicators (e.g., a 
risk perception scale).  
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Table E1. Manifestations of the Normative Assumption 
C: Deliberate analysis is a 
better motivator for proper 
risk response enactment than 
intuition. 
We found nine excerpts (from 8 papers) mentioning that analysis is the proper basis for decision-
making. For example, Heemstra and Kusters (1996) suggest that “The insight into the project 
which is required for proper risk management to take place can be enhanced if unambiguous data 
on this project and comparable previous projects are available. For this reason, we based the risk 
management method on the use of a checklist” (p. 336). 
We also identified five excerpts (from 4 papers) remarking that intuition is unreliable for 
decision-making. For example, Taylor (2007, p. 15) finds that “the greater reliance on 
naturalistic, rather than strictly rational approaches, may contribute to poor project performance”. 
More explicitly, Gemmer (1997, p. 40) suggests that “The quality of decisions based on intuitive 
estimates (guesses) may be worse than making decisions without them”.  
D: Deliberate analysis 
reduces the required 
information processing 
efforts. 
We extracted one excerpt that explicitly mentioned that analytical methods help with simplifying 
and reducing the efforts required for information processing in one excerpt: “assessors frequently 
find it easier to conceptualize a risk in terms of two measures: the probability that the risk will 
occur, and the impact of the risk if it does occur” (Powell & Klein, 1996, p. 317). 
Moreover, we coded 25 excerpts (from 13 papers) that implicitly support this manifestation by 
referring to the use of risk lists, which provide a heuristic to identify risks (e.g., in Lyytinen et 
al., 1998) and thus facilitate and standardize how risks are identified.  
Similarly, we identified 35 excerpts (from 21 papers) that provide an implicit support for this 
manifestation by discussing the notion of risk exposure, which standardizes the way in which 
multiple pieces of risk information are combined into one value. In particular, Boehm (1991, p. 
33) defines risk exposure as “RE = P(UO) * L(UO)”, with RE being risk exposure, P(UO) 
probability of an undesired outcome, and L(UO) the loss due to the undesired outcome. Boehm’s 
definition is cited by several researchers, including Barki et al. (2001, p. 43), who refer to the 
probability of “an unsatisfactory outcome” and define risk exposure as “this probability 
multiplied by the loss potential of the unsatisfactory outcome”.  
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Table E2. Manifestations of the Experiential Assumption 
Manifestation Explanation and examples 
E: Intuition covers a wider 
range of relevant risks than 
deliberate analysis using 
normative prescriptions. 
We found two explicit excerpts (from 2 papers) arguing or evidencing that risk assessment tools 
do not identify as many relevant risks as intuition does. For example, Moynihan (1996, p. 359) 
finds that in identifying risk sources, his respondents “include some situational characteristics 
not addressed in this literature”.  
Moreover, we found 8 excerpts (from 7 papers) that refer to the narrow coverage span of risk 
lists. For example, in discussing the low-expertise ITPMs’ use of risk assessment tools, Du et al. 
(2007, p. 279) suggest that the tool “made them overlook risks not captured by the tool, hence 
creating blind spots in their holistic project level risk assessments”.  
F: Intuition provides more 
realistic risk estimates than 
deliberate analysis using 
normative prescriptions. 
We coded five excerpts (from 5 papers) explicitly mentioning that the ostensible rigor of risk 
assessment tools and techniques conveys a false sense of precision. For example, Drummond 
(1996, pp. 350-351) suggests that “The greater the rigour, the greater the impression of certainty 
where none basically exists”.  
We also found two excerpts (from 2 papers) explicitly referring to the biases in the output of risk 
assessment tools. For example, Bannerman (2008, p. 2120) discusses “the prospect that risk 
assessment based on published checklists may be biased and/or limited in scope”. 
Relatedly, we extracted three excerpts (from 3 papers) mentioning that a disbelief in quantitative 
risk estimates has led ITPMs not to use the methods that generate them. For example, Taylor 
(2005, p. 441) compares the risk assessment behavior of her respondents and the normative 
prescriptions and suggests that “while further quantitative risk analysis on any high risk items is 
a recommended approach…, none of the respondents carried out any quantitative assessments”.  
G: Intuition is more 
conducive to proper risk 
response enactment than 
deliberate analysis using 
normative prescriptions. 
We identified four excerpts (in 4 papers) explicitly suggesting that ITPMs rely more on intuition 
than deliberate analysis. For examples, Ropponen (1999, p. 256) suggests: “Most managers seem 
to be managing projects based on their past experience, following ‘gut feeling’ and hoping for 
‘good luck’”.  
We also found five excerpts (in 5 papers) that explicitly mention that ITPMs analytical risk 
assessments techniques do not motivate action and are performed only in a decoupled fashion. 
For example, Drummond (1996) states that “In theory, analysis informs decision-making (e.g., 
Drummond, 1991). In practice, its role is largely symbolic. Analysis legitimates decisions by 
creating an impression of diligence whilst the assumptions upon which it is based are 
unverifiable” (p. 351). Likewise, Mignerat and Rivard (2012) discuss that “if IS project managers 
do not actually enact the practices they claim they do use, this would mean that they adopt an 
avoidance strategy, which has been widely acknowledged as a response to institutionalized 
pressures.… This would be the case of an IS project manager who develops precise project plans 
or conducts detailed risk management evaluations, without actually using them over the course 
of the project” (p. 148). 
H: Intuition is less effortful 
than deliberate analysis using 
normative prescriptions. 
The behavioral decision-making literature suggests that while the use of methods takes time and 
effort, intuition is “fast” and “frugal” (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011) because it uses only part 
of the available information and ignores the rest (Shah & Oppenheimer, 2008). Intuition is used 
not only for gathering risk information but also for processing it, which allows for handling 
complex situations through simultaneous evaluation of several pieces of information (Kahneman 
& Frederick, 2005). It thus enables thinking about a range of probable undesired outcomes rather 
than just one salient outcome, such as project failure, as considered in many risk management 
studies (e.g., Barki et al., 2001).  
We extracted three excerpts (from 3 papers) explicitly referring to the effortfulness of deliberate 
analysis. For example, referring to a specific risk list in the literature, Lim et al. (2011) argue that 
“such a lengthy list is unwieldy, and it limits the efficacy of a “checklist-based” risk management 
approach” (p. 415). We also found three excerpts (in 3 papers) reporting on behaviors that imply 
that for ITPMs do not prefer to analyze risks using the normative methods. For example, Taylor 
(2005) suggests that her respondents did not decompose risks into different dimensions: “The 
responses to the risk questions rarely took the form of an explicit estimate of impact and 
probability for a risk item. Instead, potential problems were usually assessed either on a yes/no 
basis indicating whether or not they applied, or with an estimate of whether the risk was a low, 
medium or high item with no differentiation between size of impact and likelihood of occurrence” 
(p. 439). 
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